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1 Introduction
The ability to recruit, elicit effort from, and retain civil servants is a central issue
for any government. This is particularly true in a sector such as education where
people—that is, human rather than physical resources—play a key role. Effective
teachers generate private returns for students through learning gains, educational
attainment, and higher earnings (Chetty et al., 2014a,b), as well as social returns
through improved labor-market skills that drive economic growth (Hanushek and
Woessmann, 2012). And yet in varying contexts around the world, governments
struggle to maintain a skilled and motivated teacher workforce (Bold et al., 2017).
One policy option in this context is pay-for-performance. These compensation
schemes typically reward teacher inputs such as presence and conduct in the class-
room, teacher value added based on student learning, or both (see, e.g., Muralid-
haran and Sundararaman, 2011b). In principle, they can address the difficulty of
screening for teacher quality ex ante (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010), as well as the
limited oversight of teachers on the job (Chaudhury et al., 2006).
Yet pay-for-performance divides opinion. Critics, drawing upon public adminis-
tration, social psychology, and behavioral economics, argue that pay-for-performance
could dampen the effort of workers (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003; Deci and Ryan, 1985;
Krepps, 1997). Concerns are that such schemes may: recruit the wrong types, indi-
viduals who are “in it for the money”; lower effort by eroding intrinsic motivation;
and fail to retain the right types because good teachers become de-motivated and
quit. By contrast, proponents point to classic contract theory (Lazear, 2003; Roth-
stein, 2015) and evidence from private-sector jobs with readily measurable output
(Lazear, 2000) to argue that pay-for-performance will have positive effects on both
compositional and effort margins. Under this view, such schemes: recruit the right
types, individuals who anticipate performing well in the classroom; raise effort by
strengthening extrinsic motivation; and retain the right types because good teachers
feel rewarded and stay put.
This paper conducts the first prospective, randomized controlled trial designed
to identify both the compositional and effort margins of pay-for-performance. A
novel, two-tiered experiment separately identifies these effects. This is combined
with detailed data on applicants to jobs, the skills and motivations of actual hires,
and their performance over two years on the job, to evaluate the effects of pay-for-
performance on the recruitment, effort, and retention of civil servant teachers.
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At the center of this study is a pay-for-performance (hereafter P4P) contract,
designed jointly with the Rwanda Education Board and Ministry of Education.
Building on extensive consultations and a pilot year, this P4P contract rewards the
top 20 percent of teachers with extra pay using a metric that equally weights learn-
ing outcomes in teachers’ classrooms alongside three measures of teachers’ inputs
into the classroom (presence, lesson planning, and observed pedagogy). The mea-
sure of learning used was based on a pay-for-percentile scheme that makes student
performance at all levels relevant to teacher rewards (Barlevy and Neal, 2012). The
tournament nature of this contract allows us to compare it to a fixed-wage (hereafter
FW) contract that is equal in expected payout.
Our two-tiered experiment first randomly assigns labor markets to either P4P or
FW advertisements, and then uses a surprise re-randomization of experienced con-
tracts at the school level to enable estimation of pure compositional effects within
each realized contract type. The first stage was undertaken during recruitment for
teacher placements for the 2016 school year. Teacher labor markets are defined at
the district by subject-family level. We conducted the experiment in six districts
(18 labor markets) which, together, cover more than half the upper-primary teacher
hiring lines for the 2016 school year. We recruited into the study all primary schools
that received such a teacher to fill an upper-primary teaching post (a total of 164
schools). The second stage was undertaken once 2016 teacher placements had been
finalized. Here, we randomly re-assigned each of these 164 study schools in their en-
tirety to either P4P or FW contracts; all teachers who taught core-curricular classes
to upper-primary students, including both newly placed recruits and incumbents,
were eligible for the relevant contracts. We offered a signing bonus to ensure that
no recruit, regardless of her belief about the probability of winning, could be made
worse off by the re-randomization and, consistent with this, no one turned down
their (re-)randomized contract. As advertised at the time of recruitment, incentives
were in place for two years, enabling us to study retention as well as to estimate
higher-powered tests of effects using outcomes from both years.
Our three main findings are as follows. First, on recruitment, advertised P4P
contracts did not change the distribution of measured teacher skill either among ap-
plicants in general or among new hires in particular. This is estimated sufficiently
precisely to rule out even small negative effects of P4P on measured skills. Adver-
tised P4P contracts did, however, select teachers who contributed less in a framed
Dictator Game played at baseline to measure intrinsic motivation. In spite of this,
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teachers recruited under P4P were at least as effective in promoting learning as were
those recruited under FW (holding experienced contracts constant).
Second, in terms of incentivizing effort, placed teachers working under P4P con-
tracts elicited better performance from their students than teachers working under
FW contracts (holding advertised contracts constant). Averaging over the two years
of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.11 standard deviations of
pupil learning and for the second year alone, the within-year effort effect of P4P was
0.16 standard deviations. There is no evidence of a differential impact of experienced
contracts by type of advertisement.
In addition to teacher characteristics and student outcomes, we observe a range
of teacher behaviors. These behaviors corroborate our first finding: P4P recruits
performed no worse than the FW recruits in terms of their presence, preparation,
and observed pedagogy. They also indicate that the learning gains brought about
by those experiencing P4P contracts may have been driven, at least in part, by
improved teacher presence and pedagogy. Teacher presence was 8 percentage points
higher among recruits who experienced the P4P contract compared to recruits who
experienced the FW contract. This is a sizeable impact given that baseline teacher
presence was close to 90 percent. And teachers who experienced P4P were more
effective in their classroom practices than teachers who experienced FW by 0.10
points, as measured on a 4-point scale.
Third, on retention, teachers working under P4P contracts were no more likely
to quit during the two years of the study than teachers working under FW contracts.
There was also no evidence of differential selection-out on baseline teacher charac-
teristics by experienced contract, either in terms of skills or measured motivation.
On the retention margin, we therefore find little evidence to support claims made
by either proponents or opponents of pay-for-performance.
To sum up, by the second year of the study, we estimate the within-year effort
effect of P4P to be 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect
rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection. Despite evidence of
lower intrinsic motivation among those recruited under P4P, these teachers were at
least as effective in promoting learning as were those recruited under FW. These
results support the view that pay-for-performance can improve effort while also
allaying fears of harmful effects on selection. Of course, we have studied a two-year
intervention—impacts of a long-term policy might be different, particularly if P4P
influences individuals’ early career decisions to train as a teacher.
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Our findings bring new experimental results on pay-for-performance to the litera-
ture on the recruitment of civil servants in low- and middle-income countries. Exist-
ing papers have examined the impact of advertising higher unconditional salaries and
career-track motivations, with mixed results. In Mexico, Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) find
that higher base salaries attracted both skilled and motivated applicants for civil
service jobs. In Uganda, Deserranno (2019) finds that the expectation of higher
earnings discouraged pro-social applicants for village promoter roles, resulting in
lower effort and retention. And in Zambia, Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) find that
emphasis on career-track motivations for community health work, while attracting
some applicants who were less pro-social, resulted in hires of equal pro-sociality and
greater talent overall, leading to improvements in a range of health outcomes. By
studying pay-for-performance and by separately manipulating advertised and ex-
perienced contracts, we add evidence on the compositional and effort margins of a
different, and widely debated, compensation policy for civil servants.
How the teaching workforce changes in response to pay-for-performance is of
interest in high-income contexts as well. In the United States, there is a large (but
chiefly observational) literature on the impact of compensation on who enters and
leaves the teaching workforce. Well-known studies have simulated the consequences
of dismissal policies (Chetty et al., 2014b; Neal, 2011; Rothstein, 2015) or examined
the role of teachers’ outside options in labor supply (Chingos and West, 2012). Re-
cent work has examined the District of Columbia’s teacher evaluation system, where
financial incentives are linked to measures of teacher performance (including student
test scores): Dee and Wyckoff (2015) use a regression discontinuity design to show
that low-performing teachers were more likely to quit voluntarily, while Adnot et al.
(2017) confirm that these ‘quitters’ were replaced by higher-performers. In Wiscon-
sin, a reform permitted approximately half of the state’s school districts to introduce
flexible salary schemes that allow pay to vary with performance. In that setting, Bi-
asi (2019) finds that high-value-added teachers were more likely to move to districts
with flexible pay, and were less likely to quit, than their low-value-added coun-
terparts. Our prospective, experimental study of pay-for-performance contributes
to this literature methodologically but also substantively since the Rwandan labor
market shares important features with high-income contexts.1
1Notably, there is no public sector pay premium in Rwanda, which is unusual for a low-income
country and more typical of high-income countries (Finan et al., 2017). The 2017 Rwanda Labour
Force Survey includes a small sample of recent Teacher Training College graduates (aged below age
30). Of these, 37 percent were in teaching jobs earning an average monthly salary of 43,431 RWF ,
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While our paper is not the first on the broader topic of incentive-based contracts
for teachers,2 we go to some length to address two challenges thought to be important
for policy implementation at scale. One is that the structure of the incentive should
not unfairly disadvantage any particular group (Barlevy and Neal, 2012); the other
is that the incentive should not be inappropriately narrow (Stecher et al., 2018). We
address the first issue by using a measure of learning based on a pay-for-percentile
scheme that makes student performance at all levels relevant to teacher rewards, and
the second by combining this with measures of teachers’ inputs into the classroom to
create a broad, composite metric. There is a small but growing literature studying
pay-for-percentile schemes in education: Loyalka et al. (2019) in China, Gilligan et
al. (forthcoming) in Uganda, and Mbiti et al. (2018) in Tanzania. Our contribution
is to compare the effectiveness of contracts, P4P versus FW, that are based on a
composite metric and are budget neutral in salary.
A final, methodological contribution of the paper, in addition to the experimental
design, is the way in which we develop a pre-analysis plan. In our registered plan
(AEARCTR-0002565), we pose three questions. What outcomes to study? What
hypotheses to test for each outcome? And how to test each hypothesis? We answered
the ‘what’ questions on the basis of theory, policy relevance and available data.
With these questions settled, we then answered the ‘how’ question using blinded
data. Specifically, we used a blinded dataset that allowed us to learn about a
subset of the statistical properties of our data without deriving hypotheses from
realized treatment responses, as advocated by, e.g., Olken (2015).3 This approach
achieves power gains by choosing from among specifications and test statistics on
the basis of simulated power, while protecting against the risk of false positives
that could arise if specifications were chosen on the basis of their realized statistical
significance. The spirit of this approach is similar to recent work by Anderson and
Magruder (2017) and Fafchamps and Labonne (2017).4 For an experimental study
in which one important dimension of variation occurs at the labor-market level,
and so is potentially limited in power, the gains from these specification choices are
while 15 percent were in non-teaching jobs earning a higher average monthly salary of 56,347 RWF
—a private sector premium of close to 30 percent.
2See, e.g., Imberman (2015) and Jackson et al. (2014) who provide a review.
3We have not found prior examples of such blinding in economics. Humphreys et al. (2013) argue
for, and undertake, a related approach with partial endline data in a political science application.
4In contrast to those two papers, we forsake the opportunity to undertake exploratory analysis
because our primary hypotheses were determined a priori by theory and policy relevance. In return,
we avoid having to discard part of our sample, with associated power loss.
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particularly important. The results reported in our pre-analysis plan demonstrate
that, with specifications appropriately chosen, the study design is well powered, such
that even null effects would be of both policy and academic interest.
In the remainder of the paper, Sections 2 and 3 describe the study design and
data, Sections 4 and 5 report and discuss the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Study design
2.1 Setting
The first tier of the study took place during the actual recruitment for civil service
teaching jobs in upper primary in six districts of Rwanda in 2016.5 To apply for
a civil service teaching job, an individual needs to hold a Teacher Training Col-
lege (TTC) degree. Eligibility is further defined by specialization. Districts solicit
applications at the district-by-subject-family level, aggregating curricula subjects
into three ‘families’ that correspond to the degree types issued by TTCs: math and
science (TMS); modern languages (TML); and social studies (TSS). Districts invite
applications between November and December, for the academic year beginning in
late January/early February. Individuals keen to teach in a particular district sub-
mit one application and are then considered for all eligible teaching posts in that
district in that hiring round.
Given this institutional setting, we can think of district-by-subject-family pairs
as labor markets. The subject-family boundaries of these labor markets are rigid;
within each district, TTC degree holders are considered for jobs in pools alongside
others with the same qualification. The district boundaries may be more porous,
though three quarters of the new teaching jobs in our study were filled by recruits
living within the district at the time of application. Since this is the majority of
jobs, we proceed by treating these labor markets as distinct for our primary analysis
and provide robustness checks for cross-district applications in Appendix C.6
There are 18 such labor markets in our study.7 This is a small number in terms of
statistical power (as we address below) but not from a system-scale perspective. The
study covers more than 600 hiring lines constituting over 60 percent of the country’s
5Upper primary refers to grades 4, 5, and 6; schools typically include grades 1 through 6.
6As we note in the appendix, cross-district applications would not lead us to find a selection
effect where none existed but we might overstate the magnitude of any selection effect.
7Inference based on asymptotics could easily be invalid with 18 randomizable markets. We
address this risk by committing to randomization inference for all aspects of statistical testing.
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planned recruitment in 2016. Importantly, it is not a foregone conclusion that TTC
graduates will apply for these civil service teaching jobs. Data from the 2017 Rwanda
Labour Force Survey indicate that only 37 percent of recent TTC graduates were
in teaching jobs, with 15 percent in non-teaching, salaried employment. This is not
because the teacher labor market is tight; nationwide close to a quarter of vacancies
created by a teacher leaving a school remain unfilled in the following school year
(Zeitlin, 2020). A more plausible explanation is that the recent graduates in the
outside sector earned a premium of close to 30 percent, making occupational choice
after TTC a meaningful decision.
2.2 Experiment
Contract structure The experiment was built around the comparison of two
contracts paying a bonus on top of teacher salaries in each of the 2016 and 2017
school years, and was managed by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) in coordi-
nation with REB. The first of these was a P4P contract, which paid RWF 100,000
(approximately 15 percent of annual salary) to the top 20 percent of upper-primary
teachers within a district, as measured by a composite performance metric.8 This
metric equally weighted student learning alongside three measures of teachers’ in-
puts into the classroom (presence, lesson preparation, and observed pedagogy). The
measure of learning was based on a pay-for-percentile scheme that makes student
performance at all levels relevant to teacher rewards (Barlevy and Neal, 2012).9
The 2016 performance award was conditional on remaining in post during the entire
2016 school year, and was to be paid early in 2017. Likewise, the 2017 performance
award was conditional on remaining in post during the entire 2017 school year, and
was to be paid early in 2018. The second was a fixed-wage (FW) contract that paid
RWF 20,000 to all upper-primary teachers. This bonus was paid at the same time
as the performance award in the P4P contract.
Although P4P contracts based on a composite metric of teacher inputs and
student performance have been used in a number of policy settings in the US (Im-
8The exchange rate on January 1, 2016 was 734 RWF to 1 USD, so the RWF 100,000 bonus was
worth roughly 136 USD.
9Student learning contributed to an individual teacher’s score via percentiles within student-
based brackets so that a teacher with a particular mix of low-performing and high-performing
students was, in effect, competing with other teachers with similar mixes of students. The data
used to construct this measure, and the measures of teachers’ inputs, are described in Sections
3.3 and 3.4 respectively, and we explain the adaptation of the Barlevy-Neal measure of learning
outcomes to a repeated cross-section of pupils in Appendix D.
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berman, 2015; Stecher et al., 2018), such contracts have been relatively less studied
in low- and middle-income countries. In their comprehensive review, Glewwe and
Muralidharan (2016) discuss several evaluations of teacher incentives based on stu-
dent test scores or attendance checks, but none based on a combination of both.
After extensive discussions with REB about what would be suitable in this policy
setting, a decision was made to use the P4P contract described above, based on a
composite metric.
Design overview The design, summarized visually in Figure A.1, draws on a two-
tiered experiment, as used elsewhere (see Karlan and Zinman (2009), Ashraf et al.
(2010), and Cohen and Dupas (2010) in credit-market and public-health contexts).
Both tiers employ the contract variation described above.
Potential applicants, not all of whom were observed, were assigned to either
advertised FW or advertised P4P contracts, depending on the labor market in which
they resided. Those who actually applied, and were placed into schools, fall into one
of the four groups summarized in Figure 1. For example, group a denotes teachers
who applied to jobs advertised as FW, and who were placed in schools assigned
to FW contracts, while group c denotes teachers who applied to jobs advertised as
FW and who were then placed in schools re-randomized to P4P contracts. Under
this experimental design, comparisons between groups a and b, and between groups
c and d, allow us to learn about a pure compositional effect of P4P contracts on
teacher performance, whereas comparisons along the diagonal of a–d are informative
about the total effect of such contracts, along both margins.
Figure 1: Treatment groups among recruits placed in study schools
Advertised
FW P4P
Experienced
FW a b
P4P c d
First tier randomization: Advertised contracts Our aim in the first tier
was to randomize the 18 distinct labor markets to contracts, ‘treating’ all potential
applicants in a given market so that we could detect the supply-side response to a
particular contract. The result of the randomized assignment is that 7 of these labor
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markets can be thought of as being in a ‘P4P only’ advertised treatment, 7 in a ‘FW
only’ advertised treatment, and 4 in a ‘Mixed’ advertised treatment.10 Empirically,
we consider the Mixed treatment as a separate arm; we estimate a corresponding
advertisement effect only as an incidental parameter.
This first-tier randomization was accompanied by an advertising campaign to
increase awareness of the new posts and their associated contracts.11 In November
2015, as soon as districts revealed the positions to be filled, we announced the ad-
vertised contract assignment. In addition to radio, poster, and flyer advertisements,
and the presence of a person to explain the advertised contracts at District Edu-
cation Offices, we also held three job fairs at TTCs to promote the interventions.
These job fairs were advertised through WhatsApp networks of TTC graduates. All
advertisements emphasized that the contracts were available for recruits placed in
the 2016 school year and that the payments would continue into the 2017 school
year. Applications were then submitted in December 2015. In January 2016, all dis-
tricts held screening examinations for potential candidates. Successful candidates
were placed into schools by districts during February–March 2016, and were then
assigned to particular grades, subjects, and streams by their head teachers.
Second-tier randomization: Experienced contracts Our aim in the second
tier was to randomize the schools to which REB had allocated the new posts to
contracts. A school was included in the sample if it had at least one new post
that was filled and assigned to an upper-primary grade.12 Following a full baseline
survey, schools were randomly assigned to either P4P or FW. Of the 164 schools in
the second tier of the experiment, 85 were assigned to P4P and 79 were assigned to
FW contracts.
10This randomization was performed in MATLAB by the authors. The Mixed advertised treat-
ment arose due to logistical challenges detailed in the pre-analysis plan: the first-tier randomization
was carried out at the level of the subject rather than the subject-family. An example of a district-
by-subject-family assigned to the Mixed treatment is Ngoma-TML. An individual living in Ngoma
with a TML qualification could have applied for an advertised Ngoma post in English on a FW
contract, or an advertised Ngoma post in Kinyarwanda on a P4P contract. In contrast, Kirehe-
TML is in the P4P only treatment. So someone in Kirehe with a TML qualification could have
applied for either an English or Kinyarwanda post, but both would have been on a P4P contract.
11Details of the promotional materials used in this campaign are provided in Appendix E.
12Because schools could receive multiple recruits, for different teaching specializations, it was
possible for enrolled schools to contain two recruits who had experienced distinct advertised treat-
ments. Recruits hired under the mixed advertisement treatment, and the schools in which they were
placed, also met our enrollment criteria. These were similarly re-randomized to either experienced
P4P or experienced FW in the second-tier randomization.
9
All upper-primary teachers—placed recruit or incumbent—within each school
received the new contract. At individual applicant level, this amounted to re-
randomization and hence a change to the initial assignment for some new recruits.
A natural concern is that individuals who applied under one contract, but who
were eventually offered another contract, might have experienced disappointment
(or other negative feelings) which then had a causal impact on their behavior. To
mitigate this concern, all new recruits were offered an end-of-year retention bonus of
RWF 80,000 on top of their school-randomized P4P or FW contract. An individual
who applied under advertised P4P in the hope of receiving RWF 100,000 from the
scheme, but who was subsequently re-randomized to experienced FW, was there-
fore still eligible to receive RWF 100,000 (RWF 20,000 from the FW contract plus
RWF 80,000 as a retention bonus). Conversely, an individual who applied under
advertised FW safe in the knowledge of receiving RWF 20,000 from the scheme, but
who was subsequently re-randomized to experienced P4P, was still eligible for at
least RWF 80,000. None of the recruits objected to the (re)randomization or turned
down their re-randomized contract.
Of course, surprise effects, disappointment or otherwise, may still be present in
on-the-job performance. When testing hypotheses relating to student learning, we
include a secondary specification with an interaction term to allow the estimated im-
pact of experienced P4P to differ by advertised treatment. We also explore whether
surprise effects are evident in either retention or job satisfaction. We find no evi-
dence for any surprise effect.
To ensure that teachers in P4P schools understood the new contract, we held
a compulsory half-day briefing session in every P4P school to explain the interven-
tion. This session was conducted by a team of qualified enumerators and District
Education Office staff, who themselves received three days of training from the Prin-
cipal Investigators in cooperation with IPA. Appendix E reproduces an extract of
the English version of the enumerator manual, which was piloted before use. The
sessions provided ample space for discussion and made use of practical examples.
Teachers’ understanding was tested informally at the end of the session. We also
held a comparable (but simpler) half-day briefing session in every FW school.
2.3 Hypotheses
Pre-commitment to an analytical approach can forestall p-hacking, but requires clear
specification of both what to test and how to test it; this presents an opportunity,
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as we now discuss. A theoretical model, discussed briefly below, and included in
our pre-analysis plan and Appendix B, guides our choice of what hypotheses to test.
However, exactly how to test these hypotheses in a way that maximizes statistical
power is not fully determined by theory, as statistical power may depend on features
of the data that could not be known in advance: the distribution of outcomes, their
relationships with possible baseline predictors, and so on. We used blinded data to
help decide how to test the hypotheses. In what follows we first briefly describe the
theoretical model, and then discuss our statistical approach.
Theory The model considers a fresh graduate from teacher training who decides
whether to apply for a state school teaching post, or a job in another sector (a
composite ‘outside sector’). The risk neutral individual cares about compensation
w and effort e. Her payoff is sector specific: in teaching it is w−(e2−τ e), while in the
outside sector it is w − e2. The parameter τ ≥ 0 captures the individual’s intrinsic
motivation to teach, which is perfectly observed by the individual herself but not
by the employer at the time of hiring.13 Effort generates a performance metric
m = e θ + ε, where θ ≥ 1 represents her ability, which is also private information
at the time of hiring. Compensation corresponds to one of the four cells in Figure
1. The timing is as follows. Teacher vacancies are advertised as either P4P or FW.
The individual, of type (τ, θ), applies either to a teaching job or to an outside job.
Employers hire, at random, from the set of (τ, θ) types that apply. Thereafter,
contracts are re-randomized. If the individual applies to, and is placed in a school,
she learns about her experienced contract and chooses her effort level, which results
in performance m at the end of the year. Compensation is paid according to the
experienced contract.
This model leads to the following hypotheses, as set out in our pre-analysis plan:
I. Advertised P4P induces differential application qualities;
II. Advertised P4P affects the observable skills of recruits placed in schools;
III. Advertised P4P induces differentially intrinsically motivated recruits to be
placed in schools;
IV. Advertised P4P induces the supply-side selection-in of higher- (or lower-)performing
teachers, as measured by the learning outcomes of their students;
13See Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) for a related approach to modeling differential worker motivation
across sectors.
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V. Experienced P4P creates effort incentives which contribute to higher (or lower)
teacher performance, as measured by the learning outcomes of their students;
VI. These selection and incentive effects are apparent in the composite performance
metric.
The model predicts that the set of (τ, θ) types preferring a teaching job advertised
under P4P to a job in the outside sector is different from the set of types preferring
a teaching job advertised under FW to a job in the outside sector. This gives
Hypothesis I. Since the model abstracts from labor demand effects (by assuming
employers hire at random from the set of (τ, θ) types that apply), this prediction
simply maps through to placed recruits; i.e. to Hypothesis II via θ, Hypothesis III
via τ , and Hypotheses IV to VI via the effect of θ and τ on performance.14 The
model also predicts that any given (τ, θ) type who applies to, and is placed in, a
teaching job will exert more effort under experienced P4P than experienced FW.
This gives Hypotheses V and VI via the effect of e on performance.
Analysis of blinded data Combining several previously-known insights, we used
blinded data to maximize statistical power for our main hypothesis tests.
The first insights, pertaining to simulation, are due to Humphreys et al. (2013)
and Olken (2015). Researchers can use actual outcome data with the treatment
variable scrambled or removed to estimate specifications in ‘mock’ data. This per-
mits navigation of an otherwise intractable ‘analysis tree’. They can also improve
statistical power by simulating treatment effects and choosing the specification that
minimizes the standard error. Without true treatment assignments, the influence
of any decision over eventual treatment effect estimates is unknown; thus, these
benefits are garnered without risk of p-hacking.15
14When mapping the theory to our empirical context, we distinguish between these hypotheses
for two reasons: we have better data for placed recruits because we were able to administer detailed
survey instruments to this well-defined sub-sample; and for placed recruits we can identify the
advertised treatment effect from student learning outcomes, avoiding the use of proxies for (τ, θ).
A further consideration is that the impact of advertised treatment might differ between placed
recruits and applicants due to labour-demand effects. We discuss this important issue in Section 5.
15This would not be true if, for example, an outcome in question was known to have different
support as a function of treatment, allowing the ‘blinded’ researcher to infer treatment from the
outcome variable. For our blinded pre-analysis, we only consider outcomes (TTC score, and student
test scores) that are nearly continuously distributed and which we believe are likely to have the
same support in all study arms. To make this analysis possible, we drew inspiration from Fafchamps
and Labonne (2017), who suggest dividing labor within a research team. In our case, IPA oversaw
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The second set of insights pertain to randomization inference. Since the market-
level randomization in our study involves 18 randomizable units, asymptotic infer-
ence is unsuitable, so we use randomization inference. It is known that any scalar
function of treatment and comparison groups is a statistic upon which a (correctly-
sized) randomization-inference-based test of the sharp null hypothesis could be built,
but also that such statistics may vary in their statistical power in the face of any par-
ticular alternative hypothesis (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). We anticipated that, even
with correctly-sized tests, the market-level portion of our design may present rela-
tively low statistical power. Consequently, we conducted blinded analysis to choose,
on the basis of statistical power, among testing approaches for several hypotheses:
Hypothesis I, and a common framework for Hypotheses IV and V.16
Hypothesis I is the test of whether applicants to different contracts vary in their
TTC scores. Blinded analysis, in which we simulated additive treatment effects and
calculated the statistical power under different approaches, suggested that ordinary
least squares regression (OLS) would yield lower statistical power than would a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of the equality of two distributions. Over a range
of simulations, the KS test had between one and four times the power of OLS. We
therefore committed to KS (over OLS and two other alternatives) as our primary
test of this hypothesis. This prediction is borne out in Appendix Table C.1.17
Hypotheses IV and V relate to the effects of advertised and experienced contracts
on student test scores. Here, with the re-randomization taking place at the school
level, we had many possible specifications to choose from. We examined 14 specifi-
cations (modeling random effects or fixed effects at different levels), and committed
to one with the highest power. Simulations suggested that this could produce a 20
to 25 percent narrower confidence interval than in a simple benchmark specification.
Comparing Table 3 to Appendix Table A.4, this was substantively borne out.18
On the basis of this theory and analysis of blinded data, we settled on six primary
tests: an outcome, a sample, a specification and associated test statistic, and an
the data-blinding process. Results of the blinded analysis (for which IPA certified that we used
only blinded data) are in our pre-analysis plan. Our RCT registry entry (AEARCTR-0002565) is
accompanied by IPA’s letter specifying the date after which treatment was unblinded.
16Hypotheses II and III employ data that our team collected, so did not have power concerns
associated with them; Hypothesis VI offered fewer degrees of freedom.
17The confidence interval for the KS test is roughly half the width of the corresponding OLS
confidence interval: a gain in precision commensurate with more than tripling the sample size.
18Our pre-committed random effects model yields a confidence interval 86 percent as wide as that
from OLS, commensurate with the power gain from increasing the sample size by a third.
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inference procedure for each of Hypotheses I-VI, as set out in Appendix Table A.1.
We also included a small number of secondary tests based on different outcomes,
samples, and/or specifications. In Section 4, we report results for every primary
test; secondary tests are in Section 4 or in an appendix. To aid interpretation, we
also include a small amount of supplementary analysis that was not discussed in
the pre-analysis plan—e.g. impacts of advertised P4P on teacher attributes beyond
observable skill and intrinsic motivation, and estimates from a teacher value added
model—but are cautious and make clear when this is post-hoc.
3 Data
The primary analyses make use of several distinct types of data. Conceptually,
these trace out the causal chain from the advertisement intervention to a sequence
of outcomes: that is, from the candidates’ application decisions, to the set (and
attributes) of candidates hired into schools, to the learning outcomes that they
deliver, and, finally, to the teachers’ decisions to remain in the schools. In this
section, we describe the administrative, survey, and assessment data available for
each of these steps in the causal chain. Our understanding of these data informs our
choices of specification for analysis, as discussed in detail in the pre-analysis plan.
3.1 Applications
Table 1 summarizes the applications for the newly advertised jobs, submitted in
January 2016, across the six districts.19 Of the 2,185 applications, 1,963 come from
candidates with a TTC degree—we term these qualified since a TTC degree is re-
quired for the placements at stake. In the table, we present TTC scores, genders, and
ages—the other observed CV characteristics—for all qualified applicants. Besides
these two demographic variables, TTC scores are the only consistently measured
characteristics of all applicants.
The 2,185 applications come from 1,424 unique individuals, of whom 1,194 have
a TTC qualification. The majority (62 percent) of qualified applicants complete only
one application, with 22 percent applying to two districts and 16 percent applying
to three or more. Multiple applications are possible but not the norm, most likely
because each district requires its own exam. Of those applying twice, 92 percent
19These data were obtained from the six district offices and represent a census of applications for
the new posts across these districts.
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Table 1: Application characteristics, by district
Gatsibo Kayonza Kirehe Ngoma Nyagatare Rwamagana All
Applications 390 310 462 381 327 315 2,185
Qualified 333 258 458 365 272 277 1,963
Has TTC score 317 233 405 338 260 163 1,716
Mean TTC score 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.53
SD TTC score 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.15
Qualified female 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.48
Qualified age 27.32 27.78 27.23 27.23 26.98 27.50 27.33
applied to adjacent pairs of districts. In Appendix C, we use this geographical
feature of applications to test for cross-district labor-supply effects and fail to reject
the null that these effects are zero.
3.2 Teacher attributes
During February and March 2016, we visited schools soon after they were enrolled
in the study to collect baseline data using surveys and ‘lab-in-the-field’ instruments.
School surveys were administered to head teachers or their deputies, and included a
variety of data on management practices—not documented here—as well as admin-
istrative records of teacher attributes, including age, gender, and qualifications. The
data cover all teachers in the school, regardless of their eligibility for the interven-
tion. Teacher surveys were administered to all teachers responsible for at least one
upper-primary, core-curricular subject and included questions about demographics,
training, qualifications and experience, earnings, and other characteristics.
The ‘lab-in-the-field’ instruments were administered to the same set of teachers,
and were intended to measure the two characteristics introduced in the theory:
intrinsic motivation and ability. In the model, more intrinsically motivated teachers
derive a higher benefit (or lower cost) from their efforts to promote learning. To
capture this idea of other-regarding preferences towards students, taking inspiration
from the work of Ashraf et al. (2014), we used a framed version of the Dictator Game
(Eckel and Grossman, 1996).20 Teachers were given 2,000 Rwandan francs (RWF)
and asked how much of this money they wished to allocate to the provision of school
20Previous work shows the reliability of the DG as a measure of other-regarding preferences
related to intrinsic motivation (Banuri and Keefer, 2016; Brock et al., 2016; Deserranno, 2019).
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supply packets for students in their schools, and how much they wished to keep for
themselves. Each packet contained one notebook and pen and was worth 200 RWF.
Teachers could decide to allocate any amount, from zero to all 2,000 RWF, which
would supply ten randomly chosen students with a packet.
We also asked teachers to undertake a Grading Task which measured their mas-
tery of the curriculum in the main subject that they teach.21 Teachers were asked
to grade a student examination script, and had 5 minutes to determine if a series
of student answers were correct or incorrect. They received a fixed payment for
participation. Performance on this task was used to estimate a measure of teacher
skill based on a two-parameter item response theory (IRT) model.
3.3 Student learning
Student learning was measured in three rounds of assessment: baseline, the end of
the 2016 school year, and the end of the 2017 school year (indexed by r = 0, 1, 2).
These student assessments play a dual role in our study: they provide the primary
measure of learning for analysis of program impacts, and they were used in the
experienced P4P arm for purposes of performance awards.
Working with the Ministry of Education, we developed comprehensive subject-
and grade-specific, competency-based assessments for grades 4, 5 and 6. These as-
sessments were based on the new Rwanda national curriculum and covered the five
core subjects: Kinyarwanda, English, Mathematics, Sciences, and Social Studies.
There was one assessment per grade-subject, with students at the beginning of the
year being assessed on the prior year’s material. Each test aimed to cover the entire
curriculum for the corresponding subject and year, with questions becoming pro-
gressively more difficult as a student advanced in the test. The questions were a
combination of multiple choice and fill-in diagrams. The tests were piloted exten-
sively; they have no ceiling effects while floor effects are limited.22 In each round,
we randomly sampled a subset of students from each grade to take the test. In Year
1, both baseline and endline student samples were drawn from the official school
register of enrolled students compiled by the head teacher at the beginning of the
year. This ensured that the sampling protocol did not create incentives for strategic
21See Bold et al. (2017) who use a similar approach to assess teacher content knowledge.
22Test scores are approximately normally distributed with a mean of close to 50 percent of
questions answered correctly. A validation exercise of the test at baseline found its scores to be
predictive of the national Primary Leaving Exam scores (both measured in school averages).
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exclusion of students. In Year 2, students were assessed at the end of the year only,
and were sampled from a listing that we collected in the second trimester.
Student samples were stratified by teaching streams (subgroups of students
taught together for all subjects). In Round 0, we sampled a minimum of 5 pupils
per stream, and oversampled streams taught in at least one subject by a new recruit
to fill available spaces, up to a maximum of 20 pupils per stream and 40 per grade.
In rare cases of grades with more than 8 streams, we sampled 5 pupils from all
streams. In Round 1, we sampled 10 pupils from each stream: 5 pupils retained
from the baseline (if the stream was sampled at baseline) and 5 randomly sampled
new pupils. We included the new students to alleviate concerns that teachers in
P4P schools might teach (only) to previously sampled students. In Round 2, we
randomly sampled 10 pupils from each stream using the listing for that year.23
The tests were orally administered by trained enumerators. Students listened to
an enumerator as he/she read through the instructions and test questions, prompt-
ing students to answer. The exam was timed for 50 minutes, allowing for 10 minutes
per section. Enumerators administered the exam using a timed proctoring video on
electronic tablets, which further ensured consistency in test administration. Individ-
ual student test results were kept confidential from teachers, parents, head teachers,
and Ministry of Education officials, and have only been used for performance award
and evaluation purposes in this study.
Responses were used to estimate a measure of student learning (for a given stu-
dent in a given round and given subject in a given grade) based on a two-parameter
IRT model. We use empirical Bayes estimates of student ability from this model as
our measure of a student’s learning level in a particular grade.
3.4 Teacher inputs
We collected data on several dimensions of teachers’ inputs into the classroom.
This was undertaken in P4P schools only during Year 1 , and in both P4P and FW
schools in Year 2. This composite metric is based on three teacher input measures
(presence, lesson preparation, and observed pedagogy), and one output measure
(pupil learning)—the ‘4Ps’. Here we describe the input components measured.
23Consequently, the number of pupils assessed in Year 2 who have also been assessed in Year 1 is
limited. Because streams are reshuffled across years and because we were not able to match Year 2
pupil registers to Year 1 registers in advance of the assessment, it was not possible to sample pupils
to maintain a panel across years while continuing to stratify by stream.
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To assess the three inputs, P4P schools received three unannounced surprise
visits: two spot checks during Summer 2016, and one spot check in Summer 2017.
During these visits, Sector Education Officers (SEOs) from the District Education
Offices (in Year 1) or IPA staff (for logistical reasons, in Year 2) observed teachers
and monitored their presence, preparation and pedagogy with the aid of specially
designed tools.24 FW schools also received an unannounced visit in Year 2, at the
same time as the P4P schools. Table A.2 shows summary statistics for each of these
three input measures over the three rounds of the study.
Presence is defined as the fraction of spot-check days that the teacher is present
at the start of the school day. For the SEO to record a teacher present, the head
teacher had to physically show the SEO that the teacher was in school.
Lesson preparation is defined as the planning involved with daily lessons, and
is measured through a review of teachers’ weekly lesson plans. Prior to any spot
checks, teachers in grades 4, 5, and 6 in P4P schools were reminded how to fill
out a lesson plan in accordance with REB guidelines. Specifically, SEOs provided
teachers with a template to record their lesson preparation, focusing on three key
components of a lesson—the lesson objective, the instructional activities, and the
types of assessment to be used. A ‘hands-on’ session enabled teachers to practice
using this template. During the SEO’s unannounced visit, he/she collected the daily
lesson plans (if any had been prepared) from each teacher. Field staff subsequently
used a lesson-planning scoring rubric to provide a subjective measure of quality.
Because a substantial share of upper-primary teachers did not have a lesson plan
on a randomly chosen audit day, we used the presence of such a lesson plan as a
summary measure in both the incentivized contracts and as an outcome for analysis.
Pedagogy is defined as the practices and methods that teachers use in order
to impact student learning. We collaborated with both the Ministry of Education
and REB to develop a monitoring instrument to measure teacher pedagogy through
classroom observation. Our classroom observation instrument measured objective
teacher actions and skills as an input into scoring teachers’ pedagogical performance.
Our rubric was adapted from the Danielson Framework for Teaching, which is widely
24Training of SEOs took place over two days. Day 1 consisted of an overview of the study and
its objectives and focused on how to explain the intervention (in particular the 4Ps) to teachers
in P4P schools using the enumerator manual in Appendix E. During Day 2, SEOs learned how to
use the teacher monitoring tools and how to conduct unannounced school visits. SEOs were shown
videos recorded during pilot visits. SEOs were briefed on the importance of not informing teachers
or head teachers ahead of the visits. Field staff monitored the SEOs’ adherence to protocol.
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used in the U.S. (Danielson, 2007). The observer evaluated the teachers’ effective
use of 21 different activities over the course of a full 45-minute lesson. Based on these
observations and a detailed rubric, the observer provided a subjective score, on a
scale from zero to three, of four components of the lesson: communication of lesson
objectives, delivery of material, use of assessment, and student engagement. The
teacher’s incentivized score, as well the measure of pedagogy used in our analysis,
is defined as the average of these ratings across the four domains.
3.5 Balance
We use the baseline data described in this section to check whether the second-tier
randomization produced an appropriately ‘balanced’ experienced treatment assign-
ment. Table 2 confirms that across a wide range of school, teacher, and student
characteristics there are no statistically significant differences in means between the
experienced P4P and FW treatment arms.25
4 Results
Our two-tiered experiment allows us to estimate impacts of pay-for-performance on
the type of individuals applying to, and being placed in, primary teaching posts
(the compositional margin), and on the activities undertaken by these new recruits
(the effort margin). We report these results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Of
course, the long-run effects of pay-for-performance will depend not only on selection-
in, but also selection-out, as well as the dynamics of the behavioral response on the
part of teachers who stay. We address dynamic issues in Section 4.3, and postpone
a substantive discussion of results until Section 5. All statistical tests are conducted
via randomization inference with 2,000 permutations of the experienced treatment.
4.1 Compositional margin of pay-for-performance
We study three types of compositional effect of pay-for-performance. These are
impacts on: the quality of applicants; the observable skill and motivation of placed
recruits on arrival; and the student learning induced by these placed recruits during
their first and second year on the job.
25Since the teacher inputs described in Section 3.4 were collected after the second-tier random-
ization, they are not included in Table 2. See instead Appendix Table A.2.
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Table 2: Baseline characteristics and balance of experienced P4P assignment
Control mean Experienced P4P
[St. Dev.] (p-value) Obs.
Panel A. School attributes
Number of streams 9.99 -0.10 164
[4.48] (0.882)
Number of teachers 20.47 0.56 164
[8.49] (0.730)
Number of new recruits 1.94 0.13 164
[1.30] (0.503)
Number of students 410.06 1.42 164
[206.71] (0.985)
Share female students 0.58 0.00 164
[0.09] (0.777)
Panel B. Upper-primary teacher recruit attributes
Female 0.36 -0.02 242
[0.48] (0.779)
Age 25.82 -0.25 242
[4.05] (0.616)
DG share sent 0.28 -0.04 242
[0.33] (0.450)
Grading task score -0.24 0.12 242
[0.93] (0.293)
Panel C. Pupil learning assessments
English -0.00 0.04 13826
[1.00] (0.551)
Kinyarwanda -0.00 0.05 13831
[1.00] (0.292)
Mathematics 0.00 -0.00 13826
[1.00] (0.950)
Science -0.00 0.03 13829
[1.00] (0.607)
Social Studies -0.00 0.02 13829
[1.00] (0.670)
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for attributes of schools, teachers (new recruits placed
in upper primary only), and students collected at baseline. The first column presents means in FW
schools, (with standard deviations in brackets); the second column presents estimated differences
between FW and P4P schools (with randomization inference p-values in parentheses). The sample
in Panel B consists of new recruits placed in upper-primary classrooms at baseline, who undertook
the lab-in-the-field exercises. In Panel B, Grading Task IRT scores are standardized based on the
distribution among incumbent teachers. In Panel C, student learning IRT scores are standardized
based on the distribution in the experienced FW arm.
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Quality of applicants Motivated by the theoretical model sketched in Section
2.3, we begin by testing for impacts of advertised P4P on the quality of applicants to
a given district-by-qualification pool (Hypothesis I). We focus on Teacher Training
College final exam score since this is the only consistently measured quality-related
characteristic we observe for all applicants.
Our primary test uses a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (henceforth, KS) statistic to test
the null that there is no difference in the distribution of TTC scores across advertised
P4P and advertised FW labor markets. This test statistic can be written as
TKS = sup
y
∣∣∣FˆP4P (y)− FˆFW (y)∣∣∣ = max
i=1,...,N
∣∣∣FˆP4P (yi)− FˆFW (yi)∣∣∣ . (1)
Here, FˆP4P (y) denotes the empirical cumulative distribution function of TTC scores
among applicants who applied under advertised P4P, evaluated at some specific TTC
score y. Likewise, FˆFW (y) denotes the empirical cumulative distribution function of
TTC scores among applicants who applied under advertised FW, evaluated at the
same TTC score y. We test the statistical significance of this difference in distribu-
tions by randomization inference. To do so, we repeatedly sample from the set of
potential (advertised) treatment assignments T A and, for each such permutation,
calculate the KS test statistic. The p-value is then the share of such test statistics
larger in absolute value than the statistic calculated from the actual assignment.
Figure 2: Distribution of applicant TTC score, by advertised treatment arm
Notes: KS test-statistic is 0.026, with a p-value of 0.909.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of applicant TTC score, by advertised treatment
arm. These distributions are statistically indistinguishable between advertised P4P
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and advertised FW. The KS test-statistic has a value of 0.026, with a p-value of
0.909. Randomization inference is well-powered, meaning that we can rule out even
small effects on the TTC score distribution: a 95 percent confidence interval based
on inversion of the randomization inference test rules out additive treatment effects
outside of the range [−0.020, 0.020]. (The OLS estimate of this additive treatment
effect is -0.001, as reported in Table C.1.) We therefore conclude that there was no
meaningful impact of advertised P4P on the TTC final exam scores of applicants.26
Below, we move on to consider impacts of advertised P4P on the quality of
applicants who were offered a post and chose to accept it—a subset that we term
placed recruits. It is worth emphasizing that we may find results here even though
there is no evidence of an impact on the distribution of TTC score of applicants.
This is because, for this well-defined set of placed recruits, we have access to far
richer data: lab-in-the-field instruments measuring attributes on arrival, as well as
measures of student learning in the first and second years on the job.
Skill and motivation of placed recruits Along the lines suggested by Dal Bo´
and Finan (2016), we explore whether institutions can attract the most capable or
the most intrinsically motivated into public service. We include multidimensional
skill and motivation types in the theoretical model and test the resulting hypotheses
(Hypotheses II and III) using the data described in Section 3.2. Specifically, we use
the Grading Task IRT score to measure a placed recruit’s skill on arrival, and the
framed Dictator Game share sent to capture baseline intrinsic motivation.
Our primary tests use these baseline attributes of placed recruits as outcomes.
For attribute x of teacher j with qualification q in district d, we estimate a regression
of the form
xjqd = τAT
A
qd + γq + δd + ejqd, (2)
where treatment TAqd denotes the contractual condition under which a candidate
applied.27 Our test of the null hypothesis is the t statistic associated with coefficient
τA. We obtain a randomization distribution for this t statistic under the sharp
null of no effects for any hire by estimating equation (2) under the set of feasible
26This conclusion is further substantiated by the battery of secondary tests in Appendix C.
27Here and throughout the empirical specifications, we will define TAqd as a vector that includes
indicators for both the P4P and mixed-treatment advertisement condition. However, for hypothesis
testing, we are interested only in the coefficient on the pure P4P treatment. Defining treatment in
this way ensures that only candidates who applied (and were placed) under the pure FW treatment
are considered as the omitted category here, to which P4P recruits will be compared.
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randomizations of advertised treatments, TA ∈ T A.
Before reporting these t statistics, it is instructive to view the data graphically.
Figure 3a shows the distribution of Grading Task IRT score, and Figure 3b the
framed Dictator Game share sent, by advertised treatment arm and measured on
placed recruits’ arrival in schools. A difference in the distributions across treatment
arms is clearly visible for the measure of intrinsic motivation but not for the measure
of skill. Our regression results tell the same story. In the Grading Task IRT score
specification, our estimate of τA is −0.184, with a (randomization inference) p-
value of 0.367. In the Dictator Game share sent specification, our estimate of τA is
−0.100, with a p-value of 0.029. It follows that we cannot reject the sharp null of
no advertised P4P treatment effect on the measured skill of placed recruits, but we
can reject the sharp null of no advertised P4P treatment effect on their measured
intrinsic motivation (at the 5 percent level). Teachers recruited under advertised
P4P allocated approximately 10 percentage points less to the students on average.
Figure 3: Distribution of placed recruit attributes on arrival, by advertised treatment
arm
(a) Grading task score (b) Dictator Game contribution
Notes: In Figure 3a, the t statistic for a difference in mean Grading Task IRT score across the P4P
and FW treatments is −0.184, with a p-value of 0.367. In Figure 3b, the t statistic for a difference
in mean DG share sent across the P4P and FW treatments is −0.100, with a p-value of 0.029.
We chose not to include additional teacher attributes in the theoretical model, or
in the list of pre-specified hypotheses to avoid multiple hypothesis testing concerns.
Notwithstanding this decision, we did collect additional data on placed recruits at
baseline, meaning that we can use our two-tiered experimental design to conduct
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further exploratory analysis of the impact of advertised P4P. Specifically, we estimate
regressions of the form given in equation (2) for four additional teacher attributes:
age, gender, risk aversion, and an index capturing the Big Five personality traits.28
Results are reported in Table A.3, with details of the variable construction provided
in the table-note. We are unable to reject the sharp null of no advertised P4P
treatment effect for any of these exploratory outcomes.
Student learning induced by placed recruits The skill and motivation of
placed recruits on arrival are policy relevant insofar as these attributes translate
into teacher effectiveness. To assess this, we combine experimental variation in the
advertised contracts to which recruits applied, with the second-stage randomization
in experienced contracts under which they worked. This allows us to estimate the
impact of advertised P4P on the student learning induced by these recruits, holding
constant the experienced contract—a pure compositional effect (Hypothesis IV).
Our primary test is derived from estimates on student-subject-year level data.
The advertised treatment about which a given student’s performance is informative
depends on the identity of the placed recruit teaching that particular subject via
qualification type and district. We denote this by TAqd for teacher j with qualification
type q in district d, and suppress the dependence of the teacher’s qualification q on
the subject b, stream k, school s, and round r, which implies that q = q(bksr). The
experienced treatment is assigned at the school level, and is denoted by TEs . We
pool data across the two years of intervention to estimate a specification of the type
zibksr = τAT
A
qd + τET
E
s + λIIj + λET
E
s Ij + ρbrz¯ks,r−1 + δd + ψr + eibksr (3)
for the learning outcome of student i in subject b, stream k, school s, and round
r. We define j = j(bksr) as an identifier for the teacher assigned to that subject-
stream-school-round. The variable Ij is an indicator for whether the teacher is an
incumbent, and the index q = q(j) denotes the qualification type of teacher j if that
teacher is a recruit (and is undefined if the teacher is an incumbent, so that TAqd is
always zero for incumbents). Drawing on the pseudo-panel of student outcomes, the
variable z¯ks,r−1 denotes the vector of average outcomes in the once-lagged assessment
among students placed in that stream, and its coefficient, ρbr, is subject- and round-
28Here we follow Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) who measure the risk preferences and Big Five personality
traits of applicants for civil service jobs in Mexico, and Callen et al. (2018) who study the relevance
of Big Five personality traits for the performance of health workers in Pakistan.
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specific. The coefficient of interest is τA: the average of the within-year effect of
advertised P4P on pupil learning in Year 1 and the within-year effect of advertised
P4P on pupil learning in Year 2.29
The theoretical model of Appendix B, as well as empirical evidence from other
contractual settings (Einav et al., 2013), suggests that pay-for-performance may
induce selection on the responsiveness to performance incentives. If so, then the
impact of advertised treatment will depend on the contractual environment into
which recruits are placed. Consequently, we also estimate a specification that al-
lows advertised treatment effects to differ by experienced treatment, including an
interaction term between the two treatments. This interacted model takes the form
zibksr = τAT
A
qd+τET
E
s +τAET
A
qdT
E
s +λIIj+λET
E
s Ij+ρbgrz¯ks,r−1+δd+ψr+eibksr. (4)
Here, the compositional effect of advertised P4P among recruits placed in FW
schools is given by τA (a comparison of on-the-job performance across groups a
and b, as defined in Figure 1). Likewise, the compositional effect of advertised P4P
among recruits placed in P4P schools is given by τA+τAE (a comparison of groups c
and d). If τAE is not zero, then this interacted model yields the more policy relevant
estimands (Muralidharan et al., 2019). Noting the distinction between estimands
and test statistics (Imbens and Rubin, 2015), we pre-specified the pooled coefficient
τA from equation (3) as the primary test statistic for the presence of compositional
effects. Our simulations, using blinded data, show that this pooled test is better
powered under circumstances where the interaction term, τAE , is small.
We estimate equations (3) and (4) by a linear mixed effects model, allowing for
normally distributed random effects at the student-round level.30 Randomization
inference is used throughout. To do so, we focus on the distribution of the estimated
z-statistic (i.e., the coefficient divided by its estimated standard error), which al-
lows rejections of the sharp null of no effect on any student’s performance to be
interpreted, asymptotically, as rejection of the non-sharp null that the coefficient
29We focus on within-year impacts because there is not a well-defined cumulative treatment effect.
Individual students receive differing degrees of exposure to the advertised treatments depending on
their path through streams (and hence teachers) over Years 1 and 2.
30In our pre-analysis plan, simulations using the blinded data indicated that the linear mixed
effects model with a student-round normal random effects would maximize statistical power. We
found precisely this in the unblinded data. For completeness, and purely as supplementary analysis,
we also present estimates and hypotheses tests via ordinary least squares. See Appendix Table A.4.
These OLS estimates are generally larger in magnitude and stronger in statistical significance.
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is equal to zero (DiCiccio and Romano, 2017). Inference for τA is undertaken by
permutation of the advertised treatment, TA ∈ T A, while inference for τE likewise
proceeds by permuting the experienced treatment TE ∈ T E . To conduct inference
about the interaction term, τAE in equation (4), we simultaneously permute both
dimensions of the treatment, considering pairs (TA, TE) from the set T A × T E .
Table 3: Impacts on student learning, linear mixed effects model
Pooled Year 1 Year 2
Model A: Direct effects only
Advertised P4P (τA) 0.01 -0.03 0.04
[-0.04, 0.08] [-0.06, 0.03] [-0.05, 0.16]
(0.75) (0.20) (0.31)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.11 0.06 0.16
[0.02, 0.21] [-0.03, 0.15] [0.04, 0.29]
(0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.06 -0.05 -0.09
[-0.20, 0.08] [-0.19, 0.11] [-0.24, 0.07]
(0.36) (0.54 ) (0.27 )
Model B: Interactions between advertised and experienced contracts
Advertised P4P (τA) 0.01 -0.02 0.03
[-0.05, 0.14] [-0.06, 0.07] [-0.05, 0.21]
(0.46) (0.62) (0.22)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.12 0.06 0.18
[0.05, 0.25] [-0.01, 0.19] [0.08, 0.33]
(0.01) (0.10) (0.00)
Advertised P4P ×
Experienced P4P (τAE)
-0.03 -0.01 -0.04
[-0.17, 0.09] [-0.15, 0.10] [-0.22, 0.13]
(0.51) (0.65) (0.58)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.08 -0.05 -0.11
[-0.31, 0.15] [-0.30, 0.18] [-0.36, 0.14]
(0.43) (0.56) (0.38)
Observations 154594 70821 83773
Notes: For each estimated parameter, or combination of parameters, the table reports the point
estimate (stated in standard deviations of student learning), 95 percent confidence interval in brack-
ets, and p-value in parentheses. Randomization inference is conducted on the associated z statistic.
The measure of student learning is based on the empirical Bayes estimate of student ability from a
two-parameter IRT model, as described in Section 3.3.
Results are presented in Table 3. Pooling across years, the compositional effect of
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advertised P4P is small in point-estimate terms, and statistically indistinguishable
from zero (Model A, first row). We do not find evidence of selection on respon-
siveness to incentives; if anything, the effect of P4P is stronger among recruits who
applied under advertised FW contracts, although the difference is not statistically
significant and the 95 percent confidence interval for this estimate is wide (Model B,
third row). The effect of advertised P4P on student learning does, however, appear
to strengthen over time. By the second year of the study, the within-year composi-
tional effect of P4P was 0.04 standard deviations of pupil learning. OLS estimates
of this effect are larger, at 0.09 standard deviations, with a p-value of 0.11, as shown
in Table A.4.
Figure 4: Teacher value added among recruits, by advertised treatment and year
(a) Year 1 (b) Year 2
Notes: The figures plot distributions of teacher value added under advertised P4P and advertised
FW in Years 1 and 2. Value-added models estimated with school fixed effects. Randomization
inference p-value for equality in distributions between P4P and FW applicants, based on one-sided
KS test, is 0.796 using Year 1 data; 0.123 using Year 2 data; and 0.097 using pooled estimates of
teacher value added (not pre-specified).
For the purposes of interpretation, it is useful to recast the data in terms of
teacher value added. As detailed in Appendix D, we do so by estimating a teacher
valued-added (TVA) model that controls for students’ lagged test scores, as well as
school fixed effects, with the latter absorbing differences across schools attributable
to the experienced P4P treatment. This TVA model gives a sense of magnitude
to the student learning estimates in Table 3. Applying the Year 2 point estimate
for the effect of advertised P4P would raise a teacher from the 50th to above the
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76th percentile in the distribution of (empirical Bayes estimates of) teacher value
added for placed recruits who applied under FW. The TVA model also reveals the
impact of advertised P4P on the distribution of teacher effectiveness. Figure 4b
shows that the distribution of teacher value added among recruits in their second
year on the job is better, by first order stochastic dominance, under advertised P4P
than advertised FW. This finding is consistent with the view that a contract that
rewards the top quintile of teachers attracts individuals who deliver greater learning.
4.2 Effort margin of pay-for-performance
Having studied the type of individuals applying to, and being placed in, upper-
primary posts, we now consider the activities undertaken by these new recruits.
Student learning induced by placed recruits We start by using the two-tiered
experimental variation to estimate the impact of experienced P4P on the student
learning induced by the placed recruits, holding constant the advertised contract—a
pure effort effect (Hypothesis V). Our primary test uses the specification in equation
(3), again estimated by a linear mixed effects model. The coefficient of interest is
now τE . To investigate possible ‘surprise effects’ from the re-randomization, we also
consider the interacted specification of equation (4). In this model, τE gives the effect
of experienced P4P among recruits who applied under FW contractual conditions (a
comparison of groups a and c, as defined in Figure 1), while τE+τAE gives the effect
of experienced P4P among recruits who applied under P4P contractual conditions
(a comparison of groups b and d). If recruits are disappointed, because it is groups
b and c who received the surprise, τE should be smaller than τE + τAE .
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Results are presented in Table 3. Pooling across years, the within-year effect
of experienced P4P is 0.11 standard deviations of pupil learning (Model A, second
row). The randomization inference p-value is 0.03, implying that we can reject the
sharp null of no experienced P4P treatment effect on placed recruits at the 5 percent
level. We do not find evidence of disappointment caused by the re-randomization.
The interaction term is insignificant (Model B, third row) and, in point-estimate
terms, τE is larger than τE + τAE . As was the case for the compositional margin,
31We are grateful to a referee for highlighting a further interpretation: τE in Model B is the
policy-relevant estimate of experienced P4P at the start of any unexpected transition to P4P, while
τE + τAE is the policy-relevant estimate for that effect slightly further into a transition—the effect
of P4P on a cohort anticipating P4P.
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the effort effect of experienced P4P on student learning appears to strengthen over
time. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16
standard deviations of pupil learning.32
To put this in perspective, we compare the magnitude of this effort effect to
impacts in similar studies in the US, and beyond. Sojourner et al. (2014) study
pay-for-performance schemes in Minnesota, typically based on a composite metric
of subjective teacher evaluation and student performance, and find an effect of 0.03
standard deviations of pupil learning. Dee and Wyckoff (2015) study a high-stakes
incentive over a composite metric in Washington, DC, and find effects consistent
with those of Sojourner et al. (2014) in terms of the implied magnitude of effects on
pupil learning. Glewwe and Muralidharan (2016) review a range of studies, including
several in Benin, China, India and Kenya that employ incentives for either students
or teachers based solely on student performance; effect sizes are larger, typically
above 0.2 standard deviations of pupil learning. Our effort effect falls within this
range and is of a comparable magnitude to the impact in Duflo et al. (2012), who
study incentives for teacher attendance in India.
Dimensions of the composite performance metric The results in Table 3
speak to the obvious policy question, namely whether there are impacts of advertised
and experienced P4P contracts on student learning. For completeness, and to gain
an understanding into mechanisms, we complete our analysis by studying whether
there are impacts on the contracted metrics which are calculated at teacher-level
(Hypothesis VI). For these tests, we use the following specifications:
mjqsdr = τAT
A
qd + τET
E
s + λIIj + λET
E
s Ij + γq + δd + ψr + ejqsdr (5)
mjqsdr = τAT
A
qd + τET
E
s + τAET
A
qdT
E
s + λIIj + λET
E
s Ij + γq + δd + ψr + ejqsdr, (6)
for the metric of teacher j with qualification q in school s of district d, as observed
in post-treatment round r. As above, the variable Ij is an indicator for whether the
teacher is an incumbent (recall that TAqd is always zero for incumbents).
33 A linear
mixed effects model with student-level random effects is no longer applicable; out-
32Across all specifications, the interaction term between experienced P4P and an indicator for
incumbent teachers is negative, though statistically insignificant, and smaller in magnitude than
the direct effect of experienced P4P, implying a weaker—though still positive—effect of P4P on
incumbents in point-estimate terms.
33Note that any attribute of recruits themselves, even if observed at baseline, suffers from the ‘bad
controls’ problem, as the observed values of this covariate could be an outcome of the advertised
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comes are constructed at the teacher-level, and given their rank-based construction,
normality does not seem a helpful approximation to the distribution of error terms.
As stated in our pre-analysis plan, we therefore estimate equations (5) and (6) with
a round-school random-effects estimator to improve efficiency. The permutations of
treatments used for inferential purposes mirror those above.
Results are reported in Table 4 and, to the extent available, are based on pooled
data.34 Consistent with the pooled results in Table 3, we see a positive and sig-
nificant impact of experienced P4P on both the summary metric and the learning
sub-component. The specifications with teacher inputs as dependent variables sug-
gest that this impact on student learning is driven, at least in part, by improvements
in teacher presence and pedagogy. Teacher presence was 8 percentage points higher
among recruits who experienced the P4P contract compared to recruits who expe-
rienced the FW contract; an impact that is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level and sizeable in economic terms given that baseline teacher presence was already
90 percent. Recruits who experienced P4P were 0.10 points more effective in their
classroom practices than recruits receiving FW, although this impact is weaker in
terms of statistical significance (and it is possible that this improvement occurred
only during the observation). We find no evidence of impacts on lesson planning.
4.3 Dynamic effects
Our two-tiered experiment was designed to evaluate the impact of pay-for-performance
and, in particular, to quantify the relative importance of a compositional margin at
the recruitment stage versus an effort margin on the job. The hypotheses specified
in our pre-analysis plan refer to selection-in and incentives among placed recruits.
Since within-year teacher turnover was limited by design and within-year changes
in teacher skill and motivation are likely small, the total effect of P4P in Year 1
can plausibly only be driven by a change in the type of teachers recruited and/or a
change in effort resulting from the provision of extrinsic incentives.
Interpreting the total effect of P4P in Year 2 is more complex, however. First,
we made no attempt to discourage between-year teacher turnover, and so there is the
possibility of a further compositional margin at the retention stage (c.f. Muralid-
haran and Sundararaman 2011). Experienced P4P may have selected-out the low
treatment. These variables are therefore not included as independent variables.
34As discussed in Section 3.4, FW schools only received unannounced visits to measure teacher
inputs in Year 2.
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Table 4: Estimated effects on dimensions of the composite 4P performance metric
Summary
metric Preparation Presence Pedagogy
Pupil
learning
Model A: Direct effects only
Advertised P4P (τA) -0.04 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.02
[-0.09, 0.01] [-0.13, 0.32] [-0.05, 0.07] [-0.06, 0.10] [-0.08, 0.02]
(0.11) (0.40) (0.93) (0.42) (0.27)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.23 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.09
[0.19, 0.28] [-0.13, 0.16] [0.02, 0.14] [-0.00, 0.21] [0.03, 0.15]
(0.00) (0.84) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.00
[-0.01, 0.07] [-0.03, 0.18] [-0.06, 0.05] [-0.01, 0.16] [-0.04, 0.03]
(0.10) (0.17) (0.70) (0.11) (0.86)
Model B: Interactions between advertised and experienced contracts
Advertised P4P (τA) -0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.12 -0.01
[-0.12, 0.05] [-0.11, 0.48] [-0.16, 0.17] [-0.27, 0.55] [-0.12, 0.11]
(0.42) (0.19) (0.86) (0.44) (0.91)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.22 -0.00 0.08 0.17 0.08
[0.15, 0.29] [-0.26, 0.25] [-0.01, 0.16] [-0.05, 0.38] [0.00, 0.16]
(0.00) (0.97) (0.07) (0.12) (0.04)
Advertised P4P ×
Experienced P4P (τAE)
-0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 -0.03
[-0.11, 0.07] [-0.45, 0.23] [-0.12, 0.16] [-0.45, 0.24] [-0.15, 0.08]
(0.65) (0.53) (0.69) (0.53) (0.64)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00
[-0.01, 0.10] [-0.07, 0.26] [-0.09, 0.07] [-0.13, 0.14] [-0.05, 0.06]
(0.07) (0.27) (0.82) (0.96) (0.90)
Observations 3996 2514 3455 2136 3049
FW recruit mean 0.49 0.65 0.89 1.98 0.48
(SD) (0.22) (0.49) (0.31) (0.57) (0.27)
FW incumbent mean 0.37 0.50 0.87 2.05 0.45
(SD) (0.24) (0.50) (0.33) (0.49) (0.28)
Notes: For each estimated parameter, the table reports the point estimate, 95 percent confidence
interval in brackets, and p-value (or for FW means, standard deviations) in parentheses. Random-
ization inference is conducted on the associated t statistic. All estimates are pooled across years,
but outcomes are observed in the FW arm during the second year only. Outcomes are constructed
at teacher-round-level as follows: preparation is a binary indicator for existence of a lesson plan on
a randomly chosen spot-check day; presence is the fraction of spot-check days present at the start
of the school day; pedagogy is the classroom observation score, measured on a four-point scale; and
pupil learning is the Barlevy-Neal percentile rank. The summary metric places 50 percent weight
on learning and 50 percent on teacher inputs, and is measured in percentile ranks.
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skilled (Lazear, 2000) or, more pessimistically, the highly intrinsically motivated.
Second, given the longer time frame, teacher characteristics could have changed.
Experienced P4P may have eroded a given teacher’s intrinsic motivation (as hy-
pothesized in the largely theoretical literature on motivational crowding out) or,
more optimistically, encouraged a given teacher to improve her classroom skills. In
this section, we conduct an exploratory analysis of these dynamic effects.35
Retention effects We begin by exploring whether experienced P4P affects reten-
tion rates among recruits. Specifically, we look for an impact on the likelihood that
a recruit is still employed at midline in February 2017 at the start of the Year 2; i.e.
after experiencing pay-for-performance in Year 1, although before the performance
awards were announced. To do so, we use a linear probability model of the form
Pr[employediqd2 = 1] = τET
E
s + γq + δd, (7)
where employediqd2 is an indicator for whether teacher i with subject-family quali-
fication q in district d is still employed by the school at the start of Year 2, and γq
and δd are the usual subject-family qualification and district indicators.
As the first column of Table 5 reports, our estimate of τE is zero with a random-
ization inference p-value of 0.96. There is no statistically significant impact of expe-
rienced P4P on retention of recruits; the retention rate is practically identical—at
around 80 percent—among recruits experiencing P4P and those experiencing FW.
It is worth noting that there is also no impact of experienced P4P on intentions
to leave in Year 3. In the endline survey in November 2017, we asked teachers
the question:“How likely is it that you will leave your job at this school over the
coming year?”. Answers were given on a 5-point scale. For analytical purposes we
collapse these answers into a binary indicator coded to 1 for ‘very likely’ or ‘likely’
and 0 otherwise, and estimate specifications analogous to equations (5) and (6). As
the second column of Table A.5 shows, there is no statistically significant impact
of experienced P4P on recruits’ self-reported likelihood of leaving in Year 3. Our
estimate of τE is −0.06 with a randomization inference p-value of 0.40.
Of course, a retention rate of 79 percent implies 21 percent attrition from Year 1
35We emphasize that this material is exploratory; the hypotheses tested in this section were not
part of our pre-analysis plan. That said, the structure of the analysis in this section does follow a
related pre-analysis plan (intended for a companion paper) which we uploaded to our trial registry
on October 3, 2018, prior to unblinding of our data.
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Table 5: Retention of placed recruits
(1) (2) (3)
Experienced P4P 0.00 -0.04 -0.08
[0.96] [0.41] [0.23]
Interaction -0.05 0.16
[0.38] [0.36]
Heterogeneity by. . . Grading Task Dictator Game
Observations 249 238 238
Notes: For each estimated parameter, the table reports the point estimate and p-value in brackets.
Randomization inference is conducted on the associated t statistic. In each column, the outcome
is an indicator for whether the teacher is still employed at the start of Year 2. The mean of this
dependent variable for FW recruits is 0.79. In the second column, the specification includes an
interaction of experienced treatment with the teacher’s baseline Grading Task IRT score (not de-
meaned); in the third column, the interaction is with the teacher’s share sent in the baseline framed
Dictator Game (again not de-meaned). All specifications include controls for districts and subjects
of teacher qualification.
to Year 2, which is non-negligible. And the fact that retention rates are similar does
not rule out the possibility of an impact of experienced P4P on the type of recruits
retained. To explore this, we test whether experienced P4P induces differentially
skilled recruits to be retained. Here, we use teachers’ performance on the baseline
Grading Task in the primary subject they teach to obtain an IRT estimate of their
ability in this subject, denoted zi, and estimate an interacted model of the form
Pr[employediqd2 = 1] = τET
E
s + ζT
E
s zi + βzi + γq + δd. (8)
Inference for the key parameter, ζ, is undertaken by performing randomization infer-
ence for alternative assignments of the school-level experienced treatment indicator.
As the second column of Table 5 reports, our estimate of ζ is −0.05, with a random-
ization inference p-value of 0.38. There is not a significant difference in selection-out
on baseline teacher skill across the experienced treatments. Hence, there is no evi-
dence that experienced P4P induces differentially skilled recruits to be retained.
We also test whether experienced P4P induces differentially intrinsically moti-
vated recruits to be retained. Here, we use the contribution sent in the framed
Dictator Game played by all recruits at baseline, denoted xi, and re-estimate the
interacted model in equation (8), replacing zi with xi. As the third column of
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Table 5 reports, our estimate of ζ in this specification is 0.16, with a randomiza-
tion inference p-value of 0.36. There is not a significant difference in selection-out
on baseline teacher intrinsic motivation across the experienced treatments. Hence,
there is also no evidence that experienced P4P induces differentially intrinsically
motivated recruits to be retained.
Changes in retained teacher characteristics To assess whether experienced
P4P changes within-retained-recruit teacher skill or intrinsic motivation from base-
line to endline, we estimate the following ANCOVA specification
yisd2 = τET
E
s + ρyisd0 + γq + δd + eisd, (9)
where yiqsd2 is the characteristic (raw Grading Task score or framed Dictator Game
contribution) of retained recruit i with qualification q in school s and district d at
endline (round 2), and yiqsd0 is this characteristic of retained recruit i at baseline
(round 0). As the first column of Table 6 reports, our estimate of τE in the Grading
Task specification is 0.57, with a randomization inference p-value of 0.63. Our
estimate of τE in the Dictator Game specification is −0.04, with a randomization
inference p-value of 0.06. Both estimates are small in magnitude and, in the case
of the Dictator Game share sent, we reject the sharp null only at the 10 percent
level. Hence, to the extent that contributions in the Dictator Game are positively
associated with teachers’ intrinsic motivation, we find no evidence that the rising
effects of experienced P4P from Year 1 to Year 2 are driven by positive changes in
our measures of within-retained-recruit teacher skill or intrinsic motivation.36
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the Dictator Game result could be
interpreted as weak evidence that the experience of P4P contracts crowded out the
intrinsic motivation of recruits. We do not have any related measures observed
at both baseline and endline with which to further probe changes in motivation.
However, we do have a range of related measures at endline: job satisfaction, like-
lihood of leaving, and positive/negative affect.37 As Table A.5 shows, there is no
statistically significant impact of experienced P4P on any of these measures.
Further substantiating this point, Table A.6 shows the distribution of answers
36Although repeated play of lab experimental games may complicate interpretation in some con-
texts, several factors allay this concern here. First, unlike strategic games, the ‘Dictator Game’ has
no second ‘player’ about whom to learn. Second, the two rounds of play were fully two years apart.
37We follow Bloom et al. (2015) in using the Maslach Burnout Index to capture job satisfaction
and the Clark-Tellgen Index of positive and negative affect to capture the overall attitude of teachers.
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Table 6: Characteristics of retained recruits at endline
Grading Task Dictator Game
Experienced P4P 0.57 -0.04
[0.63] [0.06]
Observations 170 169
Notes: For each estimated parameter, the table reports the point estimate and p-value in brackets.
Randomization inference is conducted on the associated t statistic. In the first column, the outcome
is the Grading Task score of the teacher at endline on a (raw) scale from 0 to 30; in the second col-
umn, it is the teacher’s share sent in the framed Dictator Game played at endline. All specifications
include the outcome measured at baseline and controls for district and subject-of-qualification.
to the endline survey question: “What is your overall opinion about the idea of
providing high-performing teachers with bonus payments on the basis of objective
measures of student performance improvement?”38 The proportion giving a favor-
able answer exceeds 75 percent in every study arm. In terms of Figure 1, group a
(recruits who both applied for and experienced FW) had the most negative view of
pay-for-performance, while group c (who applied for FW but experienced P4P) had
the most positive view. Hence it seems that it was the idea, rather than the reality,
of pay-for-performance that was unpopular with (a minority of) recruits.39
5 Discussion
Compositional margin To recap from Section 4.1, we find no evidence of an ad-
vertised treatment impact on the measured quality of applicants for upper-primary
teaching posts in study districts, but we do find evidence of an advertised treatment
impact on the measured intrinsic motivation of individuals who are placed into study
schools. We draw three conclusions from these results.
First, potential applicants were aware of, and responded to, the labor market
intervention. The differences in distributions across advertised treatment arms in
Figure 3b (Dictator Game share sent) and Figure 4b (teacher valued added in Year 2)
show that the intervention changed behavior. Since these differences are for placed
recruits not applicants, it could be that this behavior change was on the labor
38We follow the phrasing used in the surveys run by Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011a).
39Consistent with our failure to find ‘surprise effects’ in student learning, there is no evidence
that the re-randomization resulted in hostility toward pay-for-performance; if anything the reverse.
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demand rather than supply side. In Appendix Figure A.2 we plot the empirical
probability of hiring as a quadratic function of the rank of an applicant’s TTC score
within the set of applicants in their district. It is clear from the figure that the
predicted probabilities are similar across P4P and FW labor markets. We also test
formally whether the probability of hiring, as a function of CV characteristics (TTC
score, age and gender), is the same under both P4P and FW advertisements.40 We
find no statistically significantly differences across advertised treatment arms.
Second, the supply-side response was, if anything, beneficial for student learning.
The P4P contract negatively selected-in the attribute measured by the baseline
Dictator Game. However, Appendix Table D.1 shows that the rank correlation
between the baseline DG share sent by recruits and their teacher value added is
small and not statistically significant. Consistent with this, our primary test rules
out meaningful negative effects of advertised P4P on student learning. In fact,
our supplementary analyses—the OLS estimates in Appendix Table A.4 and the
distributions of teacher value added in Figure 4—point to positive effects on learning
by recruits’ second year on the job. It therefore appears that only positively selected
attribute(s) mattered, at least in the five core subjects that we assessed.
Finally, districts would struggle to achieve this compositional effect directly via
the hiring process. The positively selected attribute(s) were not evident in the
metrics observed at baseline—either in TTC scores, or in the Grading Task scores
that districts could in principle adopt.41 This suggests that there is not an obvious
demand-side policy alternative to contractually induced supply-side selection.
Effort margin To recap from Section 4.2, we find evidence of a positive impact of
experienced P4P on student learning, which is considerably larger (almost tripling
in magnitude) in recruits’ second year on the job. In light of Section 4.3, we draw
the following conclusions from these results.
The additional learning achieved by recruits working under P4P, relative to re-
40Note that this is a sufficient but not necessary test of the absence of a demand-side response. It
is sufficient because districts do not interview applicants, so CVs give us the full set of characteristics
that could determine hiring. It is not necessary, however, because we observe hires rather than offers.
The probability that an offer is accepted could be affected by the advertised contract associated
with that post, even if applicants apply to jobs of both types and even if DEOs do not take contract
offer types into account when selecting the individuals to whom they would like to make offers.
41An alternative explanation for the null KS test on applicant TTC scores is that individuals
applied everywhere. If this were true, we would expect to see most candidates make multiple
applications, and a rejection of the null in a KS test on placed recruits’ TTC scores (if the supply-
side response occurred at acceptance rather than application). We do not see either in the data.
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cruits working under FW, is unlikely to be due to selection-out—the compositional
margin famously highlighted by Lazear (2000). Within-year teacher turnover was
limited by design. Between-year turnover did happen but cannot explain the ex-
perienced P4P effect. In Appendix D, we show that the rank correlation between
recruits’ baseline Grading Task IRT score and their teacher value added is positive.
However, in Section 4.3 we reported that, if anything, selection-out on baseline
teacher skill runs the wrong way to explain the experienced P4P effect.
Neither is the experienced P4P effect likely to be due to within-teacher changes
in skill or motivation. We find no evidence that recruits working under P4P made
greater gains on the Grading Task from baseline to endline than did recruits working
under FW. As already noted, recruits’ Dictator Game share sent is not a good
predictor of teacher value added. But even if it were, we find no evidence that
recruits working under P4P contributed more from baseline to endline than did
recruits working under FW, if anything the reverse.
Instead, the experienced P4P effect is most plausibly driven by teacher effort.
This conclusion follows from the arguments above and the direct evidence that
recruits working under P4P provided greater inputs than did recruits working under
FW. Specifically, the P4P contract encouraged recruits to be present in school more
often and to use better pedagogy in the classroom, behaviors that were incentivized
components of the 4P performance metric.
Total effect The total effect of the P4P contract combines both the advertised
and experienced impacts: τA + τE . By the second year of the study, the within-year
total effect of P4P is 0.04 + 0.16 = 0.20 standard deviations of pupil learning, which
is statistically significant at the one percent level. Roughly four fifths of the total
effect can thus be attributed to increased teacher effort, while the remainder arises
from supply-side selection during recruitment. At a minimum, our results suggest
that in relation to positive effort-margin effects, fears of pay-for-performance causing
motivational crowd-out among new public-sector employees may be overstated.
Our estimates raise the question of why this effect is so much stronger in Year
2 compared to Year 1, particularly on the effort margin. One interpretation is that
this is because it takes time for recruits to settle into the job and for the signal to
noise ratio in our student learning measures to improve (Staiger and Rockoff, 2010).
Consistent with this interpretation, we note that the impact of experienced P4P on
incumbents did not increase in the second year. This interpretation suggests that
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Year 2 effects are the best available estimates of longer-term impacts.
6 Conclusion
This two-tier, two-year, randomized controlled trial featuring extensive data on
teachers—their skills and motivations before starting work, multiple dimensions of
their on-the-job performance, and whether they left their jobs—offers new insights
into the compositional and effort margins of pay-for-performance. We found that
potential applicants were aware of, and responded to, the first-tier labor market
intervention. This supply-side response to advertised P4P was, if anything, benefi-
cial for student learning. We also found a positive impact of experienced P4P that
appears to stem from increased teacher effort, rather than selection-out or changes
in measured skill or intrinsic motivation.
Given these encouraging results, it is natural to ask whether it would be feasible
and cost effective to implement this P4P contract at scale. We worked closely with
the government to design a contract that was contextually feasible and well-grounded
in theory. A composite P4P metric was used to avoid narrowly emphasizing any
single aspect of teacher performance and, when measuring learning, we followed the
pay-for-percentile approach that aims to give all teachers a fair chance, regardless
of the composition of the students they teach. We also took care to ensure that the
P4P contract, if successful, could be built into the growth path of teacher wages.
While a larger bonus might have elicited stronger impacts, the expected value of
the P4P bonus was set at three percent of teacher salaries to be commensurate
with annual teacher salary increments (and discretionary pay in other sectors under
Rwanda’s imihigo system of performance contracts for civil servants).
The fact that we compared a P4P contract with an expenditure-equivalent fixed
wage alternative that is equal in magnitude to annual teacher salary increments
means that it is reasonable to think about cost effectiveness primarily in terms of
measurement. For pupil learning, the minimum requirement for the P4P contract we
study is a system of repeated annual assessments across grades and key subjects.42
Measurement of the other aspects of performance—teacher presence, preparation,
and pedagogy—can in principle be conducted by head teachers or district staff (who
are increasingly being asked to monitor teacher performance) at modest cost.
42Such a system may soon be a part of Rwanda’s ‘comprehensive assessment’ program. See, e.g.,
https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/mineducs-new-guide-student-assessment-triggers-debate.
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There are nonetheless limitations of our work. Inasmuch as the impacts on
either the compositional or effort margin might differ after five or ten years, there is
certainly scope for further study of this topic in low- and middle-income countries.
For instance, it would be interesting to explore whether long-term P4P commitments
influence early career decisions to train as a teacher; our study restricts attention
to employment choices by individuals who have already received TTC degrees.
Another set of issues relate to unintended consequences of pay-for-performance.
We found that advertised P4P attracted teachers with lower intrinsic motivation,
as measured by the share sent in the framed baseline Dictator Game. It is possible
that the students taught by these more self-regarding teachers became more self-
regarding themselves or otherwise developed different soft skills. We also found that
experienced P4P improved performance on three of the four incentivized dimensions
of the composite metric: teacher presence and pedagogy, and pupil learning. It is
conceivable that the students in P4P schools may have been impacted by ‘multi-
tasking’ as teachers focused on these dimensions to the detriment of others. Since
we did not measure aspects of student development beyond test score gains, it would
be interesting to explore these issues in future work.
Rwanda’s labor market has a characteristic that is unusual for low- and middle-
income countries: it has no public sector pay premium, and consequently many
of those qualified to teach choose not to, making it more similar to high- income
country labor markets in this regard. Whether the positive effects we find in Rwanda
of a multidimensional, pay-for-percentile contract—improving performance without
dampening employee satisfaction—will generalize to settings where public-sector
wage premiums differ remains an open question, for the education sector and beyond.
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Appendix A Supplemental figures and tables
Figure A.1: Study profile
Study sample definition
6 Districts
18 Labor markets enrolled
Randomization of labor markets to advertised contracts
Advertised P4P Advertised FW
Applications placed at District Education Offices
1,963 qualified applications
Teachers placed into schools and assigned to classes
Baseline schools enrolled
164 schools enrolled in study
Randomization of schools to experienced contracts
Experienced P4P contracts
85 schools
176 new recruits at baseline (134 upper primary)
1,608 incumbent and other teachers at baseline
(682 upper primary of these 1,608)
7,229 pupils assessed
Year 1 teacher inputs measured
Presence, preparation, pedagogy
Year 1 endline
7,495 pupils assessed
Year 2 teacher inputs measured
Year 2 endline
8,910 pupils assessed
Experienced FW contracts
79 schools
153 new recruits at baseline (126 upper primary)
1,459 incumbent and other teachers at baseline
(618 upper primary of these 1,459)
6,602 pupils assessed
Year 1 endline
6,815 pupils assessed
Year 2 teacher inputs measured
Year 2 endline
7,964 pupils assessed
Advertised mixed
A.1
Figure A.2: Probability of hiring as a function of TTC score, by advertised treatment
arm
Notes: The figure illustrates estimated hiring probability as a (quadratic) function of the rank of
an applicant’s TTC final exam score within the set of applicants in their district.
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Table A.1: Summary of hypotheses, outcomes, samples, and specifications
Outcome Sample Test statistic Randomization
inference
Hypothesis I: Advertised P4P induces differential application qualities
∗TTC exam scores Universe of applications KS test of eq. (1) T A
District exam scores Universe of applications KS test of eq. (1) T A
TTC exam scores Universe of applications tA in eq. (10) T A
TTC exam scores Applicants in the top Hˆ number of applicants,
where Hˆ is the predicted number of hires based
on subject and district, estimated off of FW ap-
plicant pools
tA in eq. (10) T A
TTC exam scores Universe of application, weighted by probability
of placement
tA in eq. (10) T A
Number of applicants Universe of applications tA in eq. (11) T A
Hypothesis II: Advertised P4P affects the observable skills of placed recruits in schools
∗Teacher skills assess-
ment IRT model EB
score
Placed recruits tA in eq. (2) T A
Hypothesis III: Advertised P4P induces differentially ‘intrinsically’ motivated recruits to be placed in schools
∗Dictator-game dona-
tions
Placed recruits tA in eq. (2) T A
Perry PSM instrument Placed recruits retained through Year 2 tA in eq. (2) T A
Hypothesis IV: Advertised P4P induces the selection of higher-(or lower-) value-added teachers
∗Student assessments
(IRT EB predictions)
Pooled Year 1 & Year 2 students tA in eq. (3) T A
Student assessments Pooled Year 1 & Year 2 students tA and tA+AE ;
tAE in eq. (4)
T A
T A × T E
Continues. . .
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Table A.1, continued
Outcome Sample Test statistic Randomization
inference
Student assessments Year 1 students tA in eq. (3) T A
Student assessments Year 2 students tA in eq. (3) T A
Hypothesis V: Experienced P4P creates incentives which contribute to higher (or lower) teacher value-added
∗Student assessments
(IRT EB predictions)
Pooled Year 1 & Year 2 students tE in eq. (3) T
E
Student assessments Pooled Year 1 & Year 2 students tE and tE+AE ;
tAE in eq. (4)
T E
T A × T E
Student assessments Year 1 students tE in eq. (3) T E
Student assessments Year 2 students tE in eq. (3) T E
Hypothesis VI: Selection and incentive effects are apparent in the 4P performance metric
∗Composite 4P metric Teachers, pooled Year 1 (experienced P4P only)
& Year 2
tA in eq. (5) T A
Composite 4P metric Teachers, pooled Year 1 (experienced P4P only)
& Year 2
tA and tA+AE ;
tE and tE+AE ;
tAE in eq. (6)
T A
T E
T A × T E
Barlevy-Neal rank As above
Teacher attendance As above
Classroom observation As above
Lesson plan (indicator) As above
Notes: Primary tests of each family of hypotheses appear first, preceded by a superscript ∗; those that appear sub-
sequently under each family without the superscript ∗ are secondary hypotheses. Under inference, T A refers to ran-
domization inference involving the permutation of the advertised contractual status of the recruit only ; T E refers to
randomization inference that includes the permutation of the experienced contractual status of the school; T A × T E
indicates that randomization inference will permute both treatment vectors to determine a distribution for the relevant
test statistic. Test statistic is a studentized coefficient or studentized sum of coefficients (a t statistic), except where
otherwise noted (as in Hypothesis I); in linear mixed effects estimates of equation (3) and (4), which are estimated by
maximum likelihood, this is a z rather than t statistic, but we maintain notation to avoid confusion with the test score
outcome, zjbksr.
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Table A.2: Measures of teacher inputs in P4P schools
Mean St Dev Obs
Year 1, Round 1
Teacher present 0.97 (0.18) 661
Has lesson plan 0.54 (0.50) 598
Classroom observation: Overall score 2.01 (0.40) 645
Lesson objective 2.00 (0.70) 645
Teaching activities 1.94 (0.47) 645
Use of assessment 1.98 (0.50) 643
Student engagement 2.12 (0.56) 645
Year 1, Round 2
Teacher present 0.96 (0.21) 648
Has lesson plan 0.54 (0.50) 598
Classroom observation: Overall score 2.27 (0.41) 639
Lesson objective 2.21 (0.77) 638
Teaching activities 2.17 (0.46) 638
Use of assessment 2.23 (0.48) 638
Student engagement 2.46 (0.49) 639
Year 2, Round 1
Teacher present 0.90 (0.31) 739
Has lesson plan 0.79 (0.41) 610
Classroom observation: Overall score 2.36 (0.35) 636
Lesson objective 2.47 (0.66) 636
Teaching activities 2.26 (0.44) 634
Use of assessment 2.25 (0.47) 635
Student engagement 2.48 (0.46) 636
Notes: Descriptive statistics for upper-primary teachers only. Overall score for the classroom ob-
servation is the average of four components: lesson objective, teaching activities, use of assessment,
and student engagement, with each component scored on a scale from 0 to 3.
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Table A.3: Impacts of advertised P4P on characteristics of placed recruits
Primary outcomes Exploratory outcomes
Teacher skills DG contribution Age Female Risk aversion Big Five
Advertised
P4P
-0.184 -0.100 -0.161 0.095 0.010 -0.007
[-0.836, 0.265] [-0.160, -0.022] [-1.648, 1.236] [-0.151, 0.255] [-0.125, 0.208] [-0.270, 0.310]
(0.367) (0.029) (0.782) (0.325) (0.859) (0.951)
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 241
Notes: The table reports the point estimate of τA, together with the 95 percent confidence interval in brackets, and the randomization inference
p-value in parentheses, from the specification in equation (2). The primary outcomes are described in detail in Section 3.2. In the third column,
the outcome is placed recruit age, measured in years. In the fourth column, the outcome is coded to 1 for female recruits and 0 for males. In the
fifth column, the outcome is a binary measure of risk aversion constructed from placed recruits’ responses in a hypothetical lottery choice game
(Chetan et al., 2010; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). It is coded to 1 when the respondent chooses either of the two riskiest of the five available
lotteries, and 0 otherwise (53 percent of the sample make one of these choices). In the final column, the outcome is an index of the Big Five
personality traits constructed from the 15 item version, validated by Lang et al. (2011) and following Dohmen and Falk (2010).
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Table A.4: Impacts on student learning, OLS model
Pooled Round 1 Round 2
Model A: Direct effects only
Advertised P4P (τA) 0.03 -0.03 0.08
[-0.04, 0.13] [-0.11, 0.07] [-0.03, 0.23]
(0.41) (0.50) (0.11)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.13 0.10 0.17
[0.03, 0.25] [-0.01, 0.20] [0.04, 0.32]
(0.01) (0.07) (0.02)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.09 -0.10 -0.09
[-0.30, 0.15] [-0.31, 0.15] [-0.35, 0.17]
(0.42) (0.41) (0.46)
Model B: Interactions between advertised and experienced contracts
Advertised P4P (τA) 0.04 -0.03 0.12
[-0.07, 0.21] [-0.15, 0.12] [-0.02, 0.32]
(0.41) (0.58) (0.10)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.14 0.10 0.17
[0.02, 0.26] [-0.03, 0.22] [0.01, 0.35]
(0.02) (0.12) (0.04)
Advertised P4P ×
Experienced P4P (τAE)
-0.03 0.01 -0.06
[-0.22, 0.17] [-0.17, 0.20] [-0.32, 0.18]
(0.75) (0.94) (0.61)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.09 -0.09 -0.09
[-0.50, 0.36] [-0.47, 0.39] [-0.56, 0.51]
(0.62) (0.60) (0.66)
Observations 154594 70821 83773
Notes: For each estimated parameter, or combination of parameters, the table reports the point
estimate (stated in standard deviations of student learning), 95 percent confidence interval in brack-
ets, and p-value in parentheses. Randomization inference is conducted on the associated t statistic.
The measure of student learning is based on the empirical Bayes estimate of student ability from a
two-parameter IRT model, as described in Section 3.3.
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Table A.5: Teacher endline survey responses
Job
satisfaction
Likelihood
of leaving
Positive
affect
Negative
affect
Model A: Direct effects only
Advertised P4P (τA) -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02
[-0.41, 0.48] [-0.27, 0.08] [-0.44, 0.33] [-0.29, 0.32]
(0.82) (0.36) (0.74) (0.86)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.05 -0.06 -0.00 0.09
[-0.25, 0.36] [-0.18, 0.06] [-0.28, 0.28] [-0.14, 0.33]
(0.72) (0.39) (0.99) (0.47)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.07
[-0.45, 0.48] [-0.13, 0.21] [-0.45, 0.52] [-0.50, 0.37]
(0.99) (0.61) (0.84) (0.70)
Model B: Interactions between advertised and experienced contracts
Advertised P4P (τA) -0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.33
[-0.57, 0.55] [-0.26, 0.18] [-0.52, 0.44] [-0.75, 0.30]
(0.67) (0.93) (0.89) (0.20)
Experienced P4P (τE) 0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.25
[-0.42, 0.54] [-0.27, 0.14] [-0.56, 0.47] [-0.67, 0.17]
(0.75) (0.50) (0.93) (0.23)
Advertised P4P ×
Experienced P4P (τAE)
0.13 -0.13 -0.16 0.64
[-0.66, 0.85] [-0.42, 0.14] [-0.81, 0.43] [0.04, 1.28]
(0.71) (0.34) (0.59) (0.03)
Experienced P4P ×
Incumbent (λE)
-0.03 0.05 0.06 0.27
[-0.90, 0.90] [-0.28, 0.37] [-0.86, 0.90] [-0.54, 1.09]
(0.92) (0.69) (0.84) (0.40)
Observations 1483 1492 1474 1447
FW recruit mean 5.42 0.26 0.31 0.00
(SD) (0.90) (0.44) (0.93) (0.99)
FW incumbent mean 5.26 0.29 -0.05 0.00
(SD) (1.10) (0.46) (1.00) (1.04)
Notes: For each estimated parameter, or combination of parameters, the table reports the point
estimate (stated in standard deviations of student learning), 95 percent confidence interval in brack-
ets, and p-value in parentheses. Randomization inference is conducted on the associated t statistic.
Outcomes are constructed as follows: job satisfaction is scored on a 7-point scale with higher num-
bers representing greater satisfaction; likelihood of leaving is a binary indicator coded to 1 if the
teacher responds that they are likely or very likely to leave their job at the current school over the
coming year; positive affect and negative affect are standardized indices derived from responses on
a 5-point Likert scale.
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Table A.6: Teacher attitudes toward pay-for-performance at endline
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
unfavorable unfavorable favourable favourable
Recruits applying under FW (64) 4.7% 4.7% 7.8% 10.9% 71.9%
—Experiencing FW (33) 6.1% 9.1% 9.1% 3.0% 72.7%
—Experiencing P4P (31) 3.2% 0.0% 6.5% 19.4% 71.0%
Recruits applying under P4P (60) 5.0% 3.3% 8.3% 1.7% 81.7%
—Experiencing FW (32) 6.3% 0.0% 6.3% 0.0% 87.5%
—Experiencing P4P (28) 3.6% 7.1% 10.7% 3.6% 75.0%
Incumbent teachers (1,113) 5.0% 7.5% 7.2% 9.9% 70.4%
—Experiencing FW (537) 5.2% 8.6% 8.0% 8.6% 69.6%
—Experiencing P4P (576) 4.9% 6.6% 6.4% 11.1% 71.0%
Notes: The table reports the distribution of answers to the following question on the endline teacher
survey: “What is your overall opinion about the idea of providing high-performing teachers with
bonus payments on the basis of objective measures of student performance improvement?” Figures
in parentheses give the number of respondents in each treatment category.
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Appendix B Theory
This appendix sets out a simple theoretical framework, adapted from Leaver et al.
(2019), that closely mirrors the experimental design described in Section 2. We used
this framework as a device to organize our thinking when choosing what hypotheses
to test in our pre-analysis plan. We did not view the framework as a means to
deliver sharp predictions for one-tailed tests.
The model
We focus on an individual who has just completed teacher training, and who must
decide whether to apply for a teaching post in a public school, or a job in a generic
‘outside sector’.43
Preferences The individual is risk neutral and cares about compensation w and
effort e. Effort costs are sector-specific. The individual’s payoff in the education
sector is w−(e2−τ e), while her payoff in the outside sector is w−e2. The parameter
τ ≥ 0 captures the individual’s intrinsic motivation to teach, and can be thought
of as the realization of a random variable. The individual observes her realization τ
perfectly, while (at the time of hiring) employers observe nothing.
Performance metrics Irrespective of where the individual works, her effort gen-
erates a performance metric m = e θ + ε. The parameter θ ≥ 1 is the individual’s
ability, and can also be thought of as the realization of a random variable. The
individual observes her realization of θ perfectly, while (at the time of hiring) em-
ployers observe nothing. Draws of the error term ε are made from U [ε, ε], and are
independent across employments.
Compensation schemes Different compensation schemes are available depend-
ing on advertised treatment status. In the advertised P4P treatment, individuals
choose between: (i) an education contract of the form, wG + B if m ≥ m, or wG
otherwise; and (ii) an outside option of the form w0 if m ≥ m, or 0 otherwise. In
the advertised FW treatment, individuals choose between: (i) an education contract
43Leaver et al. (2019) focus on a teacher who chooses between three alternatives: (i) accepting
an offer of a job in a public school on a fixed wage contract, (ii) declining and applying for a job in
a private school on a pay-for-performance contract, and (iii) declining and applying for a job in an
outside sector on a different performance contract.
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of the form wF ; and (ii) the same outside option. In our experiment, the bonus B
was valued at RWF 100,000, and the fixed-wage contract exceeded the guaranteed
income in the P4P contract by RWF 20,000 (i.e. wF − wG = 20, 000).
Timing The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Outside options and education contract offers are announced.
2. Nature chooses type (τ, θ).
3. Individuals observe their type (τ, θ), and choose which sector to apply to.
4. Employers hire (at random) from the set of applicants.
5. Surprise re-randomization occurs.
6. Individuals make effort choice e.
7. Individuals’ performance metric m is realized, with ε ∼ U [ε, ε¯].
8. Compensation paid in line with (experienced) contract offers.
Numerical example To illustrate how predictions can be made using this frame-
work, we draw on a numerical example. First, in terms of the compensation schemes,
we assume that wO = 50, B = 40, wG = 15, m = 1, and m = 4.5 (as illustrated in
Figure B.1). These five parameters, together with ε = −5 and ε = 5, pin down effort
and occupational choices by a given (τ, θ)-type. If, in addition, we make assump-
tions concerning the distributions of τ and θ, then we can also make statements
about the expected intrinsic motivation and expected ability of applicants, and the
expected performance of placed recruits. Here, since our objective is primarily ped-
agogical, we go for the simplest case possible and assume that τ and θ are drawn
independently from uniform distributions. Specifically, τ is drawn from U [0, 10],
and θ is drawn from U [1, 5].
Analysis
As usual, we solve backwards, starting with effort choices.
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Figure B.1: Compensation schemes in the numerical example
Performance	metric
Compensation
Fixed	Wage
Outside	option
P4P
𝑚𝑚
𝑤#
𝑤$
𝑤%0
𝐵
Effort incentives Effort choices under the three compensation schemes are:
eF = τ/2
eP =
θ B
2(ε¯− ε) + τ/2
eO =
θ wO
2(ε¯− ε) ,
where we have used the fact that ε is drawn from a uniform distribution. Intuitively,
effort incentives are higher under P4P than under FW, i.e. eP > eF .
Supply-side selection. The individual applies for a teaching post advertised un-
der P4P if, given her (τ, θ) type, she expects to receive a higher payoff teaching
in a school on the P4P contract than working in the outside sector. We denote
the set of such (τ, θ) types by T P . Similarly, the individual applies for a teaching
post advertised under FW if, given her (τ, θ) type, she expects to receive a higher
payoff teaching in a school on the FW contract than working in the outside sector.
We denote the set of such (τ, θ) types by T F . Figure B.2 illustrates these sets for
the numerical example. Note that the function τ∗(θ) traces out motivational types
who, given their ability, are just indifferent between applying to the education sector
under advertised P4P and applying to the outside sector, i.e.:
Pr
[
θeP + ε > m
]
B + wG − (eP )2 + τ∗eP = Pr [θeO + ε > m] wO − (eO)2.
Similarly, the function τ∗∗(θ) traces out motivational types who, given their ability,
are just indifferent between applying to the education sector under advertised FW
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Figure B.2: Decision rules under alternative contract offer treatments
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and applying to the outside sector, i.e.:
wF − (eF )2 + τ∗∗ = Pr [θeO + ε > m] · wO − (eO)2.
In the numerical example, we see a case of positive selection on intrinsic motivation
and negative selection on ability under both the FW and P4P treatments. But there
is less negative selection on ability under P4P than under FW.
Empirical implications
We used this theoretical framework when writing our pre-analysis plan to clarify
what hypotheses to test. We summarize this process for Hypotheses I and VI below.
Hypothesis I: Advertised P4P induces differential application qualities.
Define 1{(τ,θ)∈T F } and 1{(τ,θ)∈T P } as indicator functions for the application event
in the advertised FW and P4P treatments respectively. The difference in expected
intrinsic motivation and expected ability across the two advertised treatments, can
be written as:
E
[
τ · 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
]
− E
[
τ · 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
]
and
E
[
θ · 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
]
− E
[
θ · 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
]
.
In the numerical example, both differences are negative: expected intrinsic motiva-
tion and expected ability are higher in the P4P treatment than in the FW treatment.
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Hypothesis VI: Selection and incentive effects are apparent in the com-
posite 4P performance metric. We start with the selection effect. Maintaining
the assumption of no demand-side selection treatment effects, and using the decom-
position in Leaver et al. (2019), we can write the difference in expected performance
across sub-groups a and b (i.e. placed recruits who experienced FW) as:
E[ma]−E[mb] = E
[
(θ eF − θ eF ) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive effect = 0
+ E
[
θ eF ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T F } − 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect
.
Similarly, the difference in expected performance across sub-groups c and d (i.e.
placed recruits who experienced P4P) can be written as:
E[mc]−E[md] = E
[
(θ eP − θ eP ) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive effect = 0
+ E
[
θ eP ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T F } − 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect
.
In the numerical example, both differences are negative, and the second is larger
than the first.
Turning to the incentive effect, we can write the difference in expected perfor-
mance across sub-groups a and c (i.e. placed recruits who applied under advertised
FW) as:
E[ma]−E[mc] = E
[
(θ eF − θ eP ) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive effect
+ E
[
θ eF ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T F } − 1{(τ,θ)∈T F }
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect=0
.
Similarly, the difference in expected performance across sub-groups b and d (i.e.
placed recruits who applied under advertised P4P) can be written as:
E[mb]−E[md] = E
[
(θ eF − θ eP ) · 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
incentive effect
+ E
[
θ eP ·
(
1{(τ,θ)∈T P } − 1{(τ,θ)∈T P }
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection effect=0
.
In the numerical example, both differences are negative, and the second is larger
than the first. Hypothesis IV and V focus on one component of the performance
metric—student performance—and follow from the above.
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Appendix C Applications
Here, we report results from secondary tests of Hypothesis I: advertised P4P in-
duces differential application qualities, and also provide a robustness check of our
assumption that district-by-subject-family labour markets are distinct.
Secondary tests
Our pre-analysis plan included a small number of secondary tests of Hypothesis I
(see Table A.1). Three of these tests use estimates from TTC score regressions of
the form
yiqd = τAT
A
qd + γq + δd + eiqd, with weightswiqd, (10)
where yiqd denotes the TTC exam score of applicant teacher i with qualification
q in district d and treatment TAqd denotes the contractual condition under which a
candidate applied. The weighted regression parameter τA estimates the difference
in (weighted) mean applicant skill induced by advertised P4P. The fourth test is for
a difference in the number of applicants by treatment status, conditional on district
and subject-family indicators. Here, we use a specification of the form
logNqd = τAT
A
qd + γq + δd + eqd, (11)
where q indexes subject families and d indexes districts; Nqd measures the number
of qualified applicants in each district.44 Although our pre-analysis plan proposes a
fifth test—a KS test of equation (1) using district exam scores—we did not do this
because our sample of these scores was incomplete.
To undertake inference about these differences in means, we use randomization
inference, sampling repeatedly from the set of potential (advertised) treatment as-
signments T A. Following Chung and Romano (2013), we studentize this parameter
by dividing it by its (cluster-robust, clustered at the district-subject level) standard
error to control the asymptotic rejection probability against the null hypothesis of
equality of means. These are two-sided tests.45 The absolute value of the resulting
44‘Qualified’ here means that the applicant has a TTC degree. In addition to being a useful
filter for policy-relevant applications, since only qualified applicants can be hired, in some districts’
administrative data this is also necessary in order to determine the subject-family under which an
individual has applied.
45We calculated p-values for two-sided tests as provided in Rosenbaum (2010) and in the ‘Standard
Operating Procedures’ of Donald Green’s Lab at Columbia (Lin et al., 2016).
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Table C.1: Secondary tests of impacts on teacher ability in application pool
KS Unweighted
Empirical
weights Top
Number of
Applicants
Advertised
P4P
n.a. -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.040
[-0.020, 0.020] [-0.040, 0.036] [-0.038, 0.032] [-0.025, 0.008] [-0.306, 0.292]
(0.909) (0.984) (0.948) (0.331) (0.811)
Observations 1715 1715 1715 1715 18
Notes: The first column shows the confidence interval in brackets, and the p-value in parentheses,
from the primary KS test discussed in Section 4.1. The second column reports the (unweighted
OLS) point estimate of τA from the applicant TTC exam score specification in (10). The third and
fourth columns report the point estimate of τA from the same specification with the stated weights.
The fifth column reports the point estimate of τA from the number of applicants per labor market
specification in (11), with the outcome Nqd in logs.
test statistic, |tA|, is compared to its randomization distribution in order to provide
a test of the hypothesis that τA = 0.
Results are in Table C.1. The first column restates the confidence interval and p-
value from the KS test for comparison purposes. The second column reports results
for the TTC score regression where all observations are weighted equally (i.e. a
random hiring rule, as assumed in the theory). Our estimate of τA is −0.001. The
randomization inference p-value is 0.984, indicating that we cannot reject the sharp
null of no impact of advertised P4P. The third column reports results for the TTC
score regression with weights wiqd = pˆiqd, where pˆiqd is the estimated probability of
being hired as a function of district and subject indicators, as well as a fifth-order
polynomial in TTC exam scores, estimated using FW applicant pools only (i.e. the
status quo mapping from TTC scores to hiring probabilities). The fourth column
reports results for the TTC score regression with weights wiqd = 1 for the top Hˆ
teachers in their application pool, and zero otherwise (i.e. a meritocratic hiring
rule based on TTC scores alone). Here, we test for impacts on the average ability
of the top Hˆ applicants, where Hˆ is the predicted number hired in that district
and subject based on outcomes in advertised FW district-subjects. Neither set of
weights changes the conclusion from the second column: we cannot reject the sharp
null of no impact of advertised P4P. The final column reports results for the (logged)
application volume regression. Our estimate of τA is −0.040. The randomization
inference p-value of 0.811, indicating that we cannot reject the sharp null of no
impact of advertised P4P on application volumes.
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Robustness
To illustrate the implications of cross-district applications, consider an individual
living in, say, Ngoma with the TTC qualification of TSS. On the assumption that this
individual is willing to travel only to the neighbouring district of Rwamagana, she
could be impacted by the contractual offer of P4P in her home ‘Ngoma-TSS’ market
and/or the contractual offer of P4P in the adjacent ‘Rwamagana-TSS’ market. That
is, she might apply in both markets, or in Rwamagana instead of Ngoma—what
we term a cross-district labor-supply effect. The former behavior would simply
make it harder to detect a selection effect at the application stage (although not
at the placement stage since only one job can be accepted). But the latter cross-
district labor-supply effect would be more worrying. We would not find a selection
effect where none existed—without a direct effect of advertised P4P on a given
market, there cannot be cross-district effects by this posited mechanism—but we
might overstate the magnitude of any selection effect.
Our random assignment provides us with an opportunity to test for the presence
cross-district labor-supply effects. To do so, we construct an adjacency matrix,
defining two labor markets as adjacent if they share a physical border and the
same TTC subject-family qualification. We then construct a count of the number
of adjacent markets that are assigned to Advertised P4P, and an analogous count
for ‘mixed’ treatment status. Conditional on the number of adjacent markets, this
measure of the local saturation of P4P is randomly determined by the experimental
assignment of districts to advertised contractual conditions. A regression of labor-
market outcomes in a given district on both its own advertised contractual status
(direct effect) and this measure of local saturation, conditional on the number of
neighboring labor markets, provides an estimate of cross-district labor-supply effects
and, by randomization inference, a test for their presence.
Table C.2 shows results of this analysis for two key labor-market outcomes—
applicant TTC scores analyzed at the application level, and the number of appli-
cations per labor-market analyzed at the labor-market level. The direct effects of
advertised P4P on each of these outcomes are presented for comparison and remain
qualitatively unchanged relative to the estimates in Table C.1, which did not al-
low for saturation effects. Estimated saturation effects of neighboring P4P markets
are modest in estimated size and statistically insignificant for both outcomes. This
suggests that saturation effects were of limited consequence in our setting.
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Table C.2: Cross-district effects in teacher labor market outcomes
TTC scores Number of applicants
Advertised P4P
0.032 -0.085
[-0.050, 0.103] [-0.469, 0.972]
(0.297) (0.900)
Adjacent P4P markets
0.027 -0.047
[-0.022, 0.087] [-0.833, 0.573]
(0.115) (0.710)
Observations 1715 18
Notes: The table shows point estimates for the direct and local saturation effects of P4P contracts,
with confidence intervals in brackets and randomization inference p-values in parentheses. In the
first column, the unit of analysis is the application and the outcome is the TTC score of the
applicant. In the second column, the unit of analysis is the labor market and the outcome is
the number of applications, in logs. All specifications control for the total number of adjacent
markets.
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Appendix D Test-score constructs
Barlevy-Neal metric
At the core of our teacher evaluation metric is a measure of the learning gains that
teachers bring about, measured by their students’ performance on assessments. (See
Section 3 for a description of assessment procedures; throughout, we use students’
IRT-based predicted abilities to capture their learning outcomes in a given subject
and round.) To address concerns over dysfunctional strategic behavior, our objec-
tive was to follow Barlevy and Neal’s pay-for-percentile scheme as closely as was
practically possible (Barlevy and Neal, 2012, henceforth BN).
The logic behind the BN scheme is that it creates a series of ‘seeded tournaments’
that incentivize teachers to promote learning gains at all points in the student perfor-
mance distribution. In short, a teacher expects to be rewarded equally for enabling
a weak student to outperform his/her comparable peers as for enabling a strong stu-
dent to outperform his/her comparable peers. Roughly speaking, the implemented
BN scheme works as follows. Test all students in the district in each subject at the
start of the year. Take student i in stream k for subject b at grade g and find that
student’s percentile rank in the district-wide distribution of performance in that
subject and grade at baseline. Call that percentile (or interval of percentiles if data
is sparse) student i’s baseline bin.46 Re-test all students in each subject at the end
of the year. Establish student i’s end-of-year percentile rank within the comparison
set defined by his/her baseline bin. This metric constitutes student i’s contribution
to the performance score of the teacher who taught that subject-stream-grade that
school year. Repeat for all students in all subjects-streams-grades taught by that
teacher in that school year, and take the average to give the BN performance metric
at teacher level.
We adapt the student test score component of the BN scheme to allow for the
fact that we observe only a sample of students in each round in each school-subject-
stream-grade. (This was done for budgetary reasons and is a plausible feature
of the cost-effective implementation of such a scheme at scale, in an environment
in which centrally administered standardized tests are not otherwise taken by all
46In setting such as ours where the number of students is modest, there is a tradeoff in determining
how wide to make the percentile bins. As these become very narrowly defined, they contain few
students, and the potential for measurement error to add noise to the results increases. But larger
bins make it harder for teachers to demonstrate learning gains in cases where their students start
at the bottom of a bin. In practice, we use vigintiles of the district-subject distribution.
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students in all subjects.) To avoid gaming behavior—and in particular, the risk
that teachers would distort effort toward those students sampled at baseline—we
re-sampled (most) students across rounds, and informed teachers in advance that
we would do so.
Specifically, we construct pseudo-baseline bins as follows. Students sampled for
testing at the end of the year are allocated to district-wide comparison bins using
empirical CDFs of start of year performance (of different students). To illustrate,
suppose there are 20 baseline bins within a district, and that the best baseline
student in a given school-stream-subject-grade is in the (top) bin 20. Then the best
endline student in the same school-stream-subject-grade will be assigned to bin 20,
and will be compared against all other endline students within the district who have
also been placed in bin 20.
To guard against the possibility that schools might selectively withhold partic-
ular students selected from the exam, all test takers were drawn from beginning-of-
year administrative registers of students in each round. Any student who did not
take the test was assigned the minimum theoretically possible score. This feature of
our design parallels similar incentives to mitigate incentives for selective test-taking
in Glewwe et al. (2010).
Denote by zibkgdr the IRT estimate of the ability of student i in subject b, stream
k, grade g, district d, and round r. We can outline the resulting algorithm for
producing the student learning component of the assessment score for rounds r ∈
{1, 2} in the following steps:
1. Create baseline bins.
• Separately for each subject and grade, form a within-district ranking of
the students sampled at round r − 1 on the basis of zibkgd,r−1. Use this
ranking to place these round r − 1 students into B baseline bins.
• For each subject-grade-school-stream within a school, calculate the em-
pirical CDF of these baseline bins.47
2. Place end-of-year students into pseudo-baseline bins.
47There are 40 subject-grade-school streams (out of a total of 4,175) for which no baseline students
were sampled. In such cases, we use the average of the CDFs for the same subject in other streams
of the same school and grade (if available) or in the school as a whole to impute baseline learning
distributions for performance award purposes.
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• Form a within subject-stream-grade-school percentile ranking of the stu-
dents sampled at round r on the basis of zibkgdr. In practice, numbers of
sampled students varies for a given stream between baseline and endline,
so we use percentile ranks rather than simple counts. Assign the lowest
possible learning level to students who were sampled to take the test but
did not do so.
• Map percentile-ranked students at endline onto baseline bins through the
empirical CDF of baseline bins. For example, if there are 20 bins and the
best round 1 student in that subject-stream-grade-school was in the top
bin, then the best round 2 student in that subject-stream-grade-school
will be placed in pseudo-bin 20.
3. BN performance metric at student-subject level. Separately for each subject,
grade, and district, form a within-psuedo-baseline bin ranking of the students
sampled at round r on the basis of zibgdr. This is the BN performance metric
at student-subject level, which we denote by piibkgdr. It constitutes student
i’s contribution to the performance score of the teacher who taught subject b
stream k at grade g for school year r.
4. BN performance metric at teacher-level. For each teacher, compute the weighted
average of the piibkgt for all the students in the subject-stream-grades that they
taught in round r school year. This is the BN performance metric at teacher-
level. Weights wik are given by the (inverse of the) probability that student
i was sampled in stream k: the number of sampled students in that stream
divided by the number of students enrolled in the same stream. Note these
weights are determined by the number of students sampled for the test, not the
number of students who actually took the test (which may be smaller), since
our implementation of the BN metric includes, with the penalty described
above, students who were sampled for but did not sit the test.48
To construct the BN performance metric at teacher-level for the second perfor-
mance round, r = 2, we must deal with a further wrinkle, namely the fact that we
did not sample students at the start of the year. We follow the same procedure as
above except that at Step 2 we use the set of students who were sampled for and
48Our endline sampling frame covered all grades, streams, and subjects. In practice, out of 4,200
school-grade-stream-subjects in the P4P schools, we have data for a sample of students in all but
five of these, which were missed in the examination.
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actually sat the round 1 endline exam, and can be linked to an enrollment status in
a specific stream round 2, to create the baseline bins and CDFs for that year.
Teacher value added
This section briefly summarizes how we construct the measure of teacher value added
for the placed recruits, referred to at the end of Section 4.1.
We adapt the approach taken in prior literature, most notably Kane and Staiger
(2008) and Bau and Das (2020). Denoting as in equations (3) and (4) the learning
outcomes of student i in subject b, stream k of grade g, taught by teacher j in school
s and round r by zibgjsr, we express the data-generating process as:
zibgjsr = ρbgrz¯ks,r−1 + µbgr + λs + θj + ηjr + εibgjr, (12)
This adapts a standard TVA framework to use the full pseudo-panel of student learn-
ing measures. Our sampling strategy implies that most students are not observed
in consecutive assessments, as discussed in Section 3.3. We proxy for students’
baseline abilities using the vector of means of lagged learning outcomes in all sub-
jects, z¯ks,r−1, where the parameter ρbgr allows these lagged mean outcomes to have
distinct own- and cross-subject associations with subsequent learning for all sub-
jects, grades, and rounds. In a manner similar to including means instead of fixed
effects (Chamberlain, 1982; Mundlak, 1978), these baseline peer means block any
association between teacher ability (value added) and the baseline learning status
of sampled students.
In equation (12), the parameter θj is the time-invariant effect of teacher j: her
value added. We allow for fixed effects by subject-grade-rounds, µbgr, and schools
λs, estimating these within the model. We then form empirical Bayes estimates of
TVA as follows.
1. Estimate the variance of the TVA, teacher-year, and student-level errors,
θj , ηjr, εibgjr respectively, from equation (12). Defining the sum of these er-
rors as vibgjr = θj + ηjr + εibr: the last variance term can be directly esti-
mated by the variance of student test scores around their teacher-year means:
σˆ2ε = Var(vibgjr − v¯jr); the variance of TVA can be estimated from the co-
variance in teacher mean outcomes across years: σˆ2θ = Cov(v¯jr, v¯j,r−1), where
this covariance calculation is weighted by the number of students taught by
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each teacher; and the variance of teacher-year shocks can be estimated as the
residual, σˆ2η = Var(vibgjr)− σˆ2θ − σˆ2ε .
2. Form a weighted average of teacher-year residuals v¯jr for each teacher.
3. Construct the empirical Bayes estimate of each teacher’s value added by mul-
tiplying this weighted average of classroom residuals, v¯j , by an estimate of its
reliability:
V̂ Aj = v¯j
(
σˆ2θ
Var(v¯j)
)
(13)
where Var(v¯j) = σˆ
2
θ + (
∑
r hjr)
−1, with hjr = Var(v¯jr|θj)−1 =
(
σˆ2η +
σˆ2ε
njr
)−1
.
Following this procedure, we obtain a distribution of (empirical Bayes estimates
of) teacher value added for placed recruits who applied under advertised FW. The
Round 2 point estimate from the student learning model in Equation (3) would raise
a teacher from the 50th to above the 76th percentile in this distribution. Figure
4 plots the distributions of (empirical Bayes estimates of) θj + ηjr separately for
r = 1, 2, and for recruits applying under advertised FW and advertised P4P.
It is of interest to know whether the measures of teacher ability and intrinsic mo-
tivation that we use in Section 4.1 are predictive of TVA. This is undertaken in Table
D.1, where TVA is the estimate obtained pooling across rounds and treatments.49
Interestingly, the measure of teacher ability that we observe among recruits at base-
line, Grading Task IRT score, is positively correlated with TVA (rank correlation of
0.132, with a p-value of 0.039). It is also correlated with TTC final exam score (rank
correlation of 0.150, with a p-value of 0.029). However, neither the measure that
districts have access to at the time of hiring, TTC final exam score, nor the measure
of intrinsic motivation that we observe among recruits at baseline, DG share sent,
is correlated with TVA.
49We obtain qualitatively similar results for the FW sub-sample, where TVA cannot be impacted
by treatment with P4P.
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Table D.1: Rank correlation between TVA estimates, TTC scores, Grading Task
IRT scores, and Dictator Game behavior among new recruits
TVA TTC score Grading task
TTC score -0.087 . .
(0.178)
Grading task 0.132 0.150 .
(0.039) (0.029)
DG share sent -0.078 0.062 -0.047
(0.203) (0.349) (0.468)
Notes: The table provides rank correlations and associated p-values (in parentheses) for relation-
ships between recruits’ teacher value added and various measures of skill and motivation: TTC
final exam scores, baseline Grading Task IRT scores, and baseline Dictator Game share sent. We
obtain the empirical Bayes estimate of TVA from θj estimated in the school fixed-effects model in
equation (12).
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Appendix E Communication about the intervention
Promotion to potential applicants
The subsections below give details of the (translated) promotional materials that
were used in November and December 2015.
Leaflets and posters in district offices
A help desk was set up in every District Education Office. Staffers explained the
advertised contracts to individuals interested in applying, and distributed the leaflet
shown in Figure E.1, and stickers. Permanent posters, like the example shown in
Figure E.2 further summarised the programme. Staffers kept records of the number
of visitors and most frequent questions, and reported back to head office.50
Radio Ads
Radio ads were broadcast on Radio Rwanda, the national public broadcaster, during
November/December 2015 to promote awareness of the intervention. The scripts
below were developed in partnership with a local advertising agency.
Radio script 1 SFX: Noise of busy environment like a trading centre
FVO: Hey, Have you seen how good Gasasira’s children look? [This is a
cultural reference implying that teachers are smart, respected individuals and
nothing literal about how the child looks.]
MVO: Yeah! That’s not surprising though, their parents are teachers.
FVO: Hahahahah...[Sarcastic laugh as if to say, what is so great about that.]
MVO: Dont laugh...havent you heard about the new programme in the district
to recognize and reward good teachers? I wouldnt be surprised if Gasasira was
amongst those that have been recognised.
ANNOUNCER: Innovations for Poverty Action in collaboration with REB
and MINEDUC, is running the STARS program in the districts Kayonza,
Ngoma, Rwamagama, Kirehe, Gatsibo, and Nyagatare for the 2016 academic
year. Some new teachers applying to these districts will be eligible for STARS
which rewards the hardest working, most prepared and best performing teach-
ers. Eligible districts are still being finalized—keep an eye out for further
announcements!
50The respective number of visitors were: Gatsibo 305, Kayonza 241, Kirehe 411, Ngoma 320,
Nyagatara 350, and Rwamagama 447.
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Figure E.1: Leaflet advertising treatments
E.2
Figure E.2: Poster explaining the programme
Radio script 2 SFX: Sound of a street with traffic and cars hooting
VO1: Mari, hey Mariko!....What’s the rush, is everything OK?
VO2: Oh yes, everything is fine. I am rushing to apply for a job and don’t
want to find all the places taken.
VO1: Oh that’s good. And you studied to be a teacher right?
VO2: Exactly! Now I am going to submit my papers at the District Office
and hope I get lucky on this new programme that will be recognizing good
teachers!
ANNOUNCER: Innovations for Poverty Action in collaboration with REB
and MINEDUC, is running the STARS program in the districts Kayonza,
Ngoma, Rwamagama, Kirehe, Gatsibo, and Nyagatare for the 2016 academic
year. Some new teachers applying to these districts will be eligible for STARS
which rewards the hardest working, most prepared and best performing teach-
ers. Eligible districts are still being finalized—keep an eye out for further
announcements!
Radio script 3 SFX: Calm peaceful environment
VO1: Yes honestly, Kalisa is a very good teacher!
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VO2: You are right, ever since he started teaching my son, the boy now
understands maths!
VO1: Yes and because of him other parents want to take their children to his
school.
VO2: Aaah!...That must be why he was selected for the programme that
rewards good teachers.
VO1: He definitely deserves it, he is an excellent teacher.
ANNOUNCER: Innovations for Poverty Action in collaboration with REB
and MINEDUC, is running the STARS program in the districts Kayonza,
Ngoma, Rwamagama, Kirehe, Gatsibo, and Nyagatare for the 2016 academic
year. Some new teachers applying to these districts will be eligible for STARS
which rewards the hardest working, most prepared and best performing teach-
ers. Eligible districts are still being finalized—keep an eye out for further
announcements!
Briefing in P4P schools
The subsections below provide extracts of the (translated) script that was used dur-
ing briefing sessions with teachers in P4P schools in April 2016. The main purpose
of these sessions was to explain the intervention and maximise understanding of the
new contract.
Introduction
[Facilitator speaks.] You have been selected to participate in a pilot program that
Rwanda Education Board (REB) and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) are
undertaking together on paid incentives and teacher performance. As a participant
in this study, you will be eligible to receive a competitive bonus based on your
performance in the study. The top 20 percent of teachers in participating schools in
your district will receive this bonus. All participants will be considered for this paid
bonus. It is important to note that your employment status will not be affected by
your participation in this study. It will not affect whether you keep your job, receive
a promotion, etc.
You will be evaluated on four different categories:
1. Presence, which we will measure through whether you are present in school
on days when we visit;
2. Preparation, which we will measure through lesson planning;
3. Pedagogy, which we will measure through teacher observation; and
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4. Performance, which we will measure through student learning assessments.
You will receive additional information on each of these categories throughout
this training.
In your evaluation, the first three categories (presence, preparation, and peda-
gogy) will contribute equally to your inputs score. This will be averaged with your
performance score (based on student learning assessments) which will therefore be
worth half of your overall score. [Teachers are then provided with a visual aid.]
The SEO will now tell you how we are going to measure each of these components
of your performance. Before I do so, are there any questions?
Presence: Teacher attendance score
[SEO now speaks.] I will now explain to you the first component of your perfor-
mance score: Teacher Presence. During this pilot program, I will visit your school
approximately one time per term. Sometimes I will come twice or more; you will
not know in advance how many times I plan to visit in any term. These visits to
your school will be unannounced. Neither your Head Teacher nor you will know in
advance when I plan to visit your school. I will arrive approximately at the start of
the school day. Teachers who are present at that time will be marked present; those
that are not will be marked late or absent. The type of absence will be recorded.
Teachers who have excused reasons for not being present in school will be marked
excused. These reasons include paid leaves of absence, official trainings, and sick
leaves that have been granted in advance by the Head Teacher. If you are not
present because you feel unwell but have not received advance permission from the
Head Teacher, you will be marked as absent.
It is in your best interest to be present every day, or in the case of emergency,
notify the head teacher of your absence with an appropriate excuse before the be-
ginning of classes. I will also record what time you arrive to school. You will be
marked for arriving on time and arriving late to work. It is in your best interest to
arrive on time to school every day.
Preparation: Lesson planning score
Later in this session, youll be shown how to use a lesson planning form. Lesson
planning is a tool to help you improve both your organization and teaching skills.
The lesson planning form will help you to include the following components into
your lesson:
• A clear lesson objective to guide the lesson.
• Purposeful teaching activities that help students learn the skill.
• Strong assessment opportunities or exercise to assess students understanding
of the skill.
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This lesson planning form consists of three categories: lesson objective, teaching
activities, assessment/exercises. You will be evaluated on these three categories. I
will not evaluate your lesson plans. Instead, I will collect your lesson planning forms
at the end of the study. An IPA education specialist will review your lesson plans
and score them. They will compare your lesson plans to other teachers’ plans in
the district. Please be aware that these lesson plans will only be used for this study
and will not be reviewed by any MINEDUC officials. They will use the following
scoring scale, with 0 being the lowest score and 3 being the highest score. [Teachers
are then provided with a visual aid.]
You will be responsible for filling out the lesson planning form to be eligible for
the paid bonus. You will fill out a lesson plan for each day and each subject you
teach. You will fill out the lesson planning form in addition to your MINEDUC
lesson journal. Later in this session, you will have a chance to practice using the
lesson planning form. You will also see examples of strong and weak lesson plans to
help you understand our expectations.
Pedagogy: Teacher observation score
The third component that will affect your eligibility for the paid bonus is your
observation score. I will observe your classrooms during the next few weeks at least
once, and again next term. I will score your lesson in comparison to other teachers
in your district using a rubric. During the observation, I will record all the activities
and teaching strategies you use in your lesson. At the end of your lesson, I will use
my notes to evaluate your performance in the following four categories:
• Lesson objective, does your lesson have a clear objective?;
• Teaching activities, does your lesson include activities that will help students
learn the lesson?;
• Assessment and exercises, does your lesson include exercises for students to
practice the skill?; and
• Student engagement, are students engaged during the lesson and activities?
I will use a scoring rubric designed by IPA, Georgetown, and Oxford University
to evaluate your performance in each category. You will receive a score from 0 (un-
satisfactory) to 3 (exemplary) in each category. I will observe your entire lesson,
from beginning to end. I will then evaluate your performance based on the obser-
vation. You will not know when I am coming to observe your lesson, so it is in your
best interest to plan your lessons everyday as if I were coming to observe. After the
lesson, I will share your results with the Head Teacher. You will be able to obtain
a copy of your scores, together with an explanation, from the Head Teacher.
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Performance: Student test scores
[Field supervisor now speaks.] Half of your overall evaluation will be determined by
the learning achievements of your students. We have devised a system to make sure
that all teachers compete on a level playing field. If students in your school are not
as well off as students in other schools, you do not have to worry: we are rewarding
teachers for how much their students can improve, not for where they start.
Here is how this works. We randomly selected a sample of your students to take
a cumulative test, testing their knowledge of grade level content. These tests were
designed based on the curriculum, to allow us to measure the learning of students
for each subject separately. The performance of each teacher will be measured by
the learning outcomes of students in the subjects and streams that they themselves
teach. (So, if you are a P4 Maths Teacher, your performance will not be affected
by students scores in P4 English. And if you teach P4 Math for Stream A but not
Stream B, your performance measure will not depend on students scores in Stream
B.) We will compare the marks for this test with those from other students in the
same district, and place each student into one of ten groups, with Group 1 being
the best performing, Group 2 being the next-best performing, and so on, down to
Group 10. In the district as a whole, there are equal numbers of students placed
in each of these groups, but some of your students may be in the same group, and
there may be some groups in which you do not have any students at all.
At the end of this school year, we will return to your school and we will sample 10
new pupils from every stream in Upper Primary school to take a new test. This will
be a random sample. We do not know in advance who will be drawn, and students
who participated in the initial assessment have the same chance of appearing in the
end-of-year sample as anyone else. We will draw students for this assessment based
on the student enrollment register. If any student from that register is asked to
participate in the test but is no longer enrolled at the school, they will receive a
score of zero. So, you should do your best to encourage students to remain enrolled
and to participate in the assessment if asked. Once the new sample has taken
the assessment, we will sort them into groups, with the best-performing student
from the final assessment being placed into the group that was determined by the
best-performing student in the initial assessment. The second-best student from
the final assessment will be placed into the second-highest group achieved from the
initial assessment, and so on, until all students have been placed into groups. We
will then compare your students learning levels with the learning levels of other
students in the same group only. Each of your students will receive a rank, with 1
being the best, 2 being the next, and so on, within their group. (This means there
will be a 1st-ranked student in Group 1, and another student ranked first in Group
2, and so on.) The measure of your performance that we will use for your score is
the average of these within-group ranks of the students whom you teach.
This all means that you do not have to have the highest performing students in
the District in order to be ranked well. It is possible to be evaluated very well even
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if, for example, all of your students are in Group 10, the lowest-performing group:
what matters is how they perform relative to other students at the same starting
point. I will now demonstrate how this works with some examples. Please feel free
to ask questions as we go along.
Worked example 1 [Field supervisor sets up Student Test Scores Poster and
uses the Student Test Scores Figures to explain this example step by step.] Let us
see how the learning outcomes score works with a first example. For this example,
suppose that we were to sample 5 students from your class in both the beginning-
of-year and end-of-year assessments. (In reality there will be at least ten, but this
is to make the explanation easier.) Now, suppose in the initial assessment, we drew
5 students. And those students scores on the assessment might mean that they are
placed as follows:
• One student in Group 1 (top);
• One student in Group 3;
• One student in Group 6;
• One student in Group 9; and
• One student in Group 10.
Then, at the end of the school year, we will return and we will ask 5 new students
to sit for a different assessment. These are unlikely to be the same students as
before. Once they have taken the test, we will rank them, and we will put the best-
performing of the new students into Group 1, the next-best-performing of the new
students into Group 3, the next-best performing of the new students into Group
6, then Group 9, and Group 10. So, the Groups into which the new students are
placed are determined by the scores of the original students.
Finally, we will compare the actual scores of the new students to the other new
students from schools in this district who have been placed into the same groups.
For example:
• The new student placed into Group 1 might be ranked 1st within that group;
• The new student placed into Group 3 might be ranked 7th within that group;
• The new student placed into Group 6 might be ranked 4th within that group;
• The new student placed in Group 9 might also be ranked 4th within her group;
• The new student placed into Group 10 might be ranked 1st within his group.
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Then, we add up these ranks to determine your score: in this case, it is 1 +
7 + 4 + 4 + 1 = 17. That is pretty good! Remember, the lower the sum of these
ranks, the better. And notice that even though the student in Group 10 did not
have a very high score compared to everyone else in the district, he really helped
your performance measure by doing very well within his group.
Worked example 2 Now, let us try a second example. Again let us suppose that
we were to sample 5 students from your class in both the beginning-of-year and
end-of-year assessments. (Remember: in reality there will be at least ten, but this
is to make the explanation easier.) Now, suppose in the initial assessment, we drew
5 students. And those students’ scores on the assessment might mean that they are
placed as follows:
• One student in Group 1 (top);
• TWO students in Group 3;
• One student in Group 4; and
• One student in Group 5.
Notice that it is possible for two or more of your students to be in the same
group. Then, at the end of the school year, we will return and we will ask 5 new
students to sit for a different assessment. Again, these are unlikely to be the same
students as before. Now, suppose that one out of the five students that we ask for
has dropped out of school, or fails to appear for the test. They will still be counted,
but their exam will be scored as if they answered zero questions correctly—the worst
possible score. Once they have taken the test, we will rank them, and we will put
the best-performing of the new students into Group 1, the two next-best-performing
of the new students into Group 3, the next-best performing of the new students into
Group 4. The student who was not present for the test because they had dropped
out of school is placed into Group 5. As in the previous example, notice that the
groups into which the new students are placed are determined by the scores of the
original students.
Finally, we will compare the actual scores of the new students to the other new
students from schools in this district who have been placed into the same groups.
For example:
• The new student placed into Group 1 might be ranked 1st within that group;
• The new students placed in Group 3 might be ranked 4th & 7th in that group;
• The new student placed into Group 4 might be ranked 8th within that group;
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• The new student placed in Group 5, who did not actually take the test, will
be placed last in his group. If there are 40 students in the group from across
the whole district, then this would mean that his rank in that group is 40th.
Then, we add up these ranks to determine your score: in this case, it is 1+4+7+
8 + 40 = 60. Notice three points. First, even though in this example, your students
did better on the initial assessment than in the first example, this does not mean
that you scored better overall. All groups are counted equally, so that no school or
teacher will be disadvantaged in this process. Second, notice that the student who
dropped out was ranked worst out of the group to which he was assigned. Since the
lowest-performing student in the initial assessment was in Group 5, the student who
had dropped out was compared with other students placed into Group 5. Since he
received the worst possible score, he was ranked last (in this case, fortieth) within
that group. This was bad for the teachers overall performance rank. Third, teachers
will be evaluated based on the same number of students. So even if a teacher would
be teaching in several streams, resulting in more students taking the tests, his final
score will be based on a random subsample of students, such that all teachers are
evaluated on the same number of students.
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